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ABSTRACT 
ESSAYS ON FISCAL INSTITUTIONS PUBLIC EXPENDITURES AND DEBT 
By 
RAHUL PATHAK 
August 2017 
 
Committee Chair : Dr. Sally Wallace 
Major Department : Department of Public Management and Policy 
 
This three-essay dissertation focuses on the political economy of fiscal rules in a 
comparative context and highlights their unintended consequences – an issue that has received 
relatively little attention in public financial management literature. The first essay examines 
whether numerical limits on deficits, or balanced budget rules, influence the composition of 
public spending, particularly in the social sector. Using a combination of fixed effects and GMM 
regressions on a large panel of developed and developing economies, this essay finds that while 
deficit targets are effective in improving fiscal balances, they also tend to reduce social spending 
on health and social protection. This effect is particularly prominent in democratic countries, 
which often witness overspending problems. Countries that are considering adoption of such 
rules should carefully examine the effects of these requirements on expenditures that may have 
long-term positive externalities. Policymakers should explore mechanisms to minimize the 
distortionary effects of fiscal limits on spending composition. 
The second essay focusses on whether the adoption of deficit targets by subnational 
governments in India influenced the composition of public spending. Using a combination of 
fixed effects and GMM regressions, this essay finds that the adoption of Fiscal Responsibility and 
Budget Management (FRBM) legislation by Indian states improved their budget balances 
significantly. However, the post-FRBM period also witnessed significant cuts in development 
spending. Furthermore, states have reduced their capital outlay and social spending after the 
adoption of fiscal responsibility laws. Reduced expenditure on development, and capital projects 
may affect long-term economic growth, therefore future amendments to the FRBM law should 
explore mechanisms to minimize the distortionary impacts of fiscal targets on the composition 
of subnational spending.  
The third essay shifts attention to the effect of supermajority voting requirements on 
credit ratings and borrowing costs in the subnational debt market in the United States. Using a 
combination of generalized ordered logit and linear regression analyses on a sample of general 
obligation bonds issued by American state governments between 2001 and 2014, this essay 
finds that states with supermajority voting requirements for tax increases are more likely to 
receive a lower credit rating on their bonds. Furthermore, on average, the states with a 
supermajority voting requirement pay a premium of 18 to 21 basis points in true interest cost 
for their bonds. States that are considering adopting supermajority requirements should 
consider the unintended effects in terms of lower credit ratings and higher borrowing costs 
while adopting or designing such fiscal rules. The findings of this dissertation inform the policy 
debate on the subject and improve our understanding of the impact of fiscal institutions that are 
being increasingly adopted to regulate the behavior of governments across the world.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
Over the past few years, two issues have assumed center stage in public finance 
discussions, the redistributive role of government, and public-sector debt. Any discussion of 
these issues is incomplete without appropriate attention to politics and institutions. The 
political process shapes institutions, which in turn affect different public finance outcomes. In 
this context, one of the central questions that public finance scholars grapple with is how 
various political and fiscal institutions affect key outcomes such as deficits, debts, revenues, and 
expenditures. Furthermore, it is important to examine whether the institutional choices that 
governments make are causing any distortionary effects and how to mitigate such effects. 
In the aftermath of the Great Recession, these questions have regained prominence as 
countries around the world are grappling with high deficits and sluggish growth. The institutions 
of economic and fiscal governance in the Eurozone have come under constant scrutiny as 
divergence between institutions and socio-political priorities continue. Citizens across the 
industrialized and developing countries are questioning the priorities of their governments, and 
support for institutions that curtail political discretion seems to be increasing. In this context, 
several countries have adopted rules that impose additional constraints on fiscal policy by 
specifying numerical targets that governments are expected to pursue. According to the 
International Monetary Fund, only five countries had such numerical fiscal rules in 1985, but 
that number has increased to around ninety countries at present. Fiscal rules have also gained 
popularity at the subnational level across the developing and the developed world. Several 
subnational governments have adopted numerical limits and procedural rules to regulate the 
behavior of state policymakers. These institutions could assume the form of strict numerical 
limits (e.g., balanced budget requirements and expenditure or debt limits), procedural 
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requirements (e.g., medium-term reviews in several African countries and supermajority 
requirements in the United States) or a combination of the two (e.g., fiscal responsibility 
frameworks in Latin American and Asian countries). 
The previous research on the impact of these rules has focused on the implications of 
these constraints on stated goals of fiscal performance and deficit reduction. However, the 
rules that regulate the behavior of policymakers and expect to alter the direction of fiscal policy 
are likely to have repercussions beyond the stated mandate, an issue that has received relatively 
little attention in the academic literature. Therefore, in this dissertation project, I focus on the 
unintended consequences of fiscal rules in an attempt to further the debate on their benefits 
and costs. The next three chapters of this dissertation are organized around this common 
theme. 
Chapter 2 focuses on numerical fiscal rules in a cross-country context and examines the 
impact of numerical fiscal limits on social sector spending. I argue that fiscal rules such as 
balanced budget requirements change the institutional environment in which policymakers 
allocate resources, and thus they may alter the composition of public spending. Chapter 3 
extends this thesis and focusses on subnational fiscal rules in the Indian states. In both these 
chapters, I find evidence for the changing composition of government expenditure and a decline 
in public investment under the rules-based fiscal regime. Chapter 4 shifts attention to the 
impact of legislative supermajority requirements for tax increases in the U.S. on municipal 
market outcomes. I find that the states with supermajority requirements receive lower credit 
ratings on their bonds and pay higher interest costs on their general obligation debt. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE BALANCING ACT 
Do Balanced Budget Rules Reduce Social Sector Spending? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4 
 
2.1  INTRODUCTION 
In 2017, several States in the United States voted to hold a convention of states with a 
key focus on adding a balanced budget amendment to the U.S. Constitution (U.S. News, 2017). 
The balanced budget amendment proposes that the federal government spends no more than 
the tax revenues it collects, thus reducing outstanding debt and deficits. Such proposals are not 
limited to the United States, as several countries are modifying their institutional architecture 
to reduce debt and deficits. In the last thirty years, the popularity of rule-based fiscal policy has 
increased in both industrialized and developing economies. Currently, around ninety-six 
countries around the world have numerical fiscal rules that impose limits on budgetary 
aggregates (Lledó, Yoon, Fang, Mbaye, & Kim, 2017). Some countries (e.g., members of the 
European Union) have adopted these rules under supranational treaties, a few have enacted 
these limits under the influence of donor agencies (e.g., Jamaica),1 and the remaining have 
adopted the rules through domestic political processes (e.g., Brazil and India). 
 The increasing popularity of fiscal rules has motivated substantial scholarly work 
focusing on their impact on budgetary balances and fiscal discipline. However, limited research 
has examined the unintended consequences of these rules. For e.g., the impact of these rules 
on the composition of public spending has been understudied despite a high likelihood that 
these targets introduce a short-term focus in fiscal policy that leads to distortionary 
expenditure cuts and austerity measures. Some studies that have examined the spending 
impacts of fiscal rules have focused on OECD countries, and the policy prescriptions to 
                                                            
1 In the recent years, the International Monetary Fund has strongly advocated the introduction of fiscal rules in 
developing countries. In Turkey, adoption of fiscal rules was one of primary recommendations of IMF while 
discussing their stand-by agreement in 2008. Jamaica adopted a numerical fiscal rule based on the 
recommendations of IMF during the tax reform initiative in 2014. 
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developing countries are based on such evidence which may be wholly inappropriate (Cordes 
et al. 2015; Dahan & Strawczyski, 2013; Guichard et al., 2007). Developing countries face a 
different set of development challenges and public investment requirements than OECD 
countries, and restrictions on short-term deficits and debt may affect how these countries 
approach questions of long-term economic growth and development.2 
This essay examines the impact of fiscal rules on the composition of public spending 
using a large panel of developed and developing economies. Specifically, I explore whether 
sovereign governments that adopt numerical limits on deficits or balanced budget rules (BBRs) 
allocate fewer resources to the social sector (education, health, and social protection). The 
empirical results suggest that while deficit targets are effective in improving fiscal balances, they 
also tend to reduce social spending. However, the magnitude of the effect varies substantially 
across alternative estimation approaches. 
The rest of the essay proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 summarizes previous research on 
fiscal rules explaining the reasons for their adoption and evidence of their impact on spending 
and public investment. Section 2.3 outlines my theoretical argument and lays out the key 
hypotheses. Section 2.4 provides details of data, variables, and empirical strategy. Section 2.5 
summarizes the results. The last section discusses limitations of the analysis and provides 
conclusions. 
 
 
 
                                                            
2 Short-term deficits and debt are not viewed as major problems in the traditional public finance literature (Barro, 
1979). 
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2.2 PREVIOUS RESEARCH 
Several researchers in economics and political science have studied fiscal rules – 
exploring the rationale for their adoption and evaluating their effectiveness under a variety of 
political conditions. Public choice scholars believe that balanced budget rules may solve the 
overspending problem that arises from political budget cycles and collective action problems in 
democratic systems. Several explanations for overspending due to political budget cycles have 
been discussed in the literature – inability of the voters to understand intertemporal budget 
constraints (Buchanan & Wagner 1977; Wagner 1976); imposing constraints on opposition 
parties that may control future governments by accumulating more debt (Alesina & Tabellini, 
1990; Persson & Svensson, 1989; Van Der Ploeg, 1984); information asymmetry and principal-
agent problems (Brender & Drazen, 2005; Rogoff, 1990; Rogoff & Sibert, 1988; Shi & Svensson, 
2006). Furthermore, collective action problems arise because legislators and interest groups 
benefit from higher public spending for their constituents. As the number of decision makers in 
the political system increases, governments run higher deficits due to pork barrel bargaining 
(Baron & Ferejohn, 1989; Weingast, Shepsle, & Johnsen, 1981). In parliamentary systems, 
ministers lobby for higher allocation for their ministries, and, in decentralized systems, 
subnational governments with soft budget constraints may overspend, leading to higher deficits 
(Alesina, Baqir, & Easterly, 1999; von Hagen & Harden, 1995; Wyplosz, 2005). Some scholars 
suggest the adoption of fiscal rules by governments may ameliorate some of these problems. 
Critics argue that stringent fiscal rules may deepen recessions, since the discretionary 
approach to fiscal policy plays a key role in dealing with business cycles. Strict adherence to 
fiscal rules also hinders tax-smoothing and makes it more difficult to achieve traditional public 
finance goals of stabilization, fairness, and efficiency (Alesina, 2012; Barro, 1979; Kopits, 2001; 
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Wyplosz, 2005). Critics also argue that fiscal rules will be redundant if the underlying 
preferences of voters and elected representatives already favor fiscal discipline (Poterba and 
Von Hagen 1999; Schick 2004), and often, the markets may provide a sufficient nudge to 
maintain fiscal balances. If externally imposed rules do not reflect the preferences of either 
voters or policymakers, they are unlikely to comply, leading to target violations or creative 
accounting (Calderon & Schmidt-Hebbel, 2008; Milesi-Ferretti, 2004; Jürgen von Hagen & Wolff, 
2006). 
Research on the effectiveness of fiscal rules is not conclusive. However, several studies 
suggest that under certain conditions, fiscal rules may be useful in controlling deficits and 
improving fiscal balances (Krogstrup & Wälti, 2008; Poterba & Von Hagen, 1999; Von Hagen, 
2006). Studies of subnational governments in the United States and Europe find fiscal rules do 
control deficits (Alt & Lowry, 1994b; Bohn & Inman, 1996; Grembi, Nannicini, & Troiana, 2015; 
Krogstrup & Wälti, 2008; Poterba, 1994). Cross-country evidence is mixed, but a few studies 
focusing on OECD countries do find that fiscal rules improve budget balances (Badinger, 2011; 
Dahan & Strawczyski, 2013; Sacchi & Salotti, 2015). 
Fewer studies explore the relationship between fiscal rules and public spending. Dahan 
and Strawczyski (2013) examine the effect of adopting fiscal rules on budget deficits, 
government expenditure and its composition in a panel of 22 OECD countries during 1960 to 
2010. They focus on four kinds of rules: balanced budget rules, expenditure rules, participation 
in the Maastricht Treaty, and participation in the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). On the 
spending side, they focus on three expenditure components (government consumption, social 
transfers, and government investment). They find that the fiscal rules reduce budget deficits, but 
also decrease social transfers relative to government consumption (Dahan and Strawczyski, 
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2013). Guichard et al. (2007) focus on fiscal consolidation efforts in 24 OECD countries during 
1978-2005 and find that the consolidations that emphasize cuts in social spending have a higher 
chance of ‘success’ in meeting fiscal targets. Galí et al. (2003) examine the effect of fiscal rules 
on public investment in the context of the Maastricht Treaty and Stability and Growth Pact 
during 1980-2002. They find a decline in public investment in EU countries during the period, 
but they argue that it is part of a global trend and started much before the Maastricht Treaty 
was signed. Using data from 1985 to 2013, Cordes et al. (2015) find that the expenditure rules 
decreased public investment only in emerging economies, and not in industrialized economies. 
They contend that better budgetary frameworks and procedures in industrialized economies 
mitigate the adverse effects, while the emerging economies might be employing across-the-
board spending cuts for short-term compliance. A few country case-studies in Latin America 
also find an adverse effect of fiscal targets on infrastructure spending (Calderón & Servén, 2012; 
Easterly, Irwin, & Servén, 2008; Serven, 2007). 
In summary, most of the literature on the impact of fiscal rules has focussed on deficits 
and fiscal discipline, leaving the spending impacts relatively understudied. Furthermore, evidence 
on the impact of fiscal rules is particularly weak in cross-country and developing country 
contexts, mainly because of the limited availability of data. In the next section, I outline the 
theoretical arguments that inform my hypotheses about the impact of fiscal rules on the 
composition of public spending, and why we might expect a reduction in social spending in 
response to the adoption of numerical fiscal limits. 
2.3  THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
Before outlining my theoretical argument, it is useful to define what qualifies as a fiscal 
rule. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) defines a fiscal rule “as a long-lasting constraint on 
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fiscal policy through numerical limits on budgetary aggregates with primary goals such as deficit 
reduction, balancing the budget or controlling public spending” (Bova, Kinda, Muthoora, & 
Toscani, 2015; Kinda, Kolerus, Muthoora, & Weber, 2013; Lledó et al., 2017; Schaechter, Kinda, 
Budina, & Weber, 2012). The IMF classifies fiscal rules into four categories of balanced budget 
rules, expenditure rules, revenue rules, and debt limits. In this essay, I follow the IMF’s 
definition, but focus only on numerical limits on deficits or balanced budget rules. 
Why may fiscal rules reduce social spending? 
When policymakers confront a short-term deficit target, they should undertake a 
careful cost-benefit analysis – cutting expenditures with the lowest marginal social welfare and 
enacting taxes or fees that minimize deadweight loss. In addition, policymakers may employ the 
equity criterion to evaluate the revenue and expenditure portfolio, consider the positive 
externalities of expenditures, such as education and health, and account for long-term benefits 
of public investment in certain sectors such as education, health, and infrastructure.3 However, 
given the administrative realities of everyday policymaking, such revenue and expenditure 
analysis is rare. When policymakers focus on short-term rule compliance, they are to reduce 
social investments in education, health, and social security to meet fiscal goals. Several political-
economy factors may lead to such an outcome.  
Administrative Ease and Flexibility. Political agents who have the task of balancing the 
budget have limited options. Revenue instruments like new taxes or fees are unpopular with 
voters, have a time lag that does not help in meeting short-term targets and have cascading 
                                                            
3 The World Bank employs a somewhat similar framework to evaluate spending in the public expenditure reviews. 
See Pradhan (1996) and Shah (2005) for details. 
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behavioral implications. Therefore, policymakers view expenditure cuts (particularly social 
expenditures) as more feasible options. Therefore, we should expect to see expenditure 
reduction, especially reduction in social expenditures, in response to fiscal targets. By the same 
logic, we should not expect to see a significant increase in revenue collection in the aftermath 
of fiscal rule adoption, particularly in the developing economies. 
Visibility of Budget Cuts. Furthermore, a political agent who intends to meet the fiscal 
target without losing political support has an incentive to cut expenditure items that are less 
visible to voters (e.g., long-term investments in teacher training and upgrading hospital 
infrastructure) than more visible items (e.g., filling potholes or laying off public sector 
workers).4 Furthermore, electoral cycles and short time horizon of political agents may also 
contract public investment on long-term capital projects whose benefits accrue beyond the 
electoral tenure.  
Political Power of Beneficiaries. In addition, an extensive political economy literature 
highlights that poor voters have less information and ability to lobby than non-poor voters, 
which decreases the social allocations they receive (Bardhan & Mookherjee, 2000; Grossman & 
Helpman, 1996; Ravallion, 2006). Thus, during budget cuts, pro-poor budget items are more 
prone to cuts than spending that is supported by powerful interest groups.5 As a result, social 
expenditures on public health, education, and social protection that benefit lower-income 
households more, should witness a larger decrease under a rule-based fiscal regime. 
                                                            
4 This argument is an extension of the literature on political budget cycles, which makes a distinction between 
visible and invisible expenditures and argues that political agents focus more on visible expenditures during the 
election years (See Rogoff & Sibert, 1988; Rogoff, 1990). Budgeting scholars also highlight that during cutbacks, a 
significant focus is on ‘back office operations’ that are relatively less visible (Bourdeaux, 2016) 
5 Previous studies on fiscal consolidation and cutback budgeting provide some support to this thesis (Bourdeaux, 
2016; Cornia, Richard, & Stewart, 1987; Cornia & Stewart, 1993; Hicks, 1991; Ortiz & Cummins, 2013; Ravallion, 
2004, 2006).  
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Does the impact of fiscal rules vary across country groups? 
Fiscal rules may reduce social spending much more in developing economies because of 
several factors. First, developing economies have weaker electoral accountability and low 
institutional protection for social sector programs. In their study of OECD countries, Dahan & 
Strawczyski (2013) found that the negative effect of fiscal rules on social allocations is especially 
evident in countries with weaker legal protection for social rights. If their findings are valid, we 
should expect to see the particularly negative impact of fiscal rules in developing economies 
that typically have a weaker social rights framework. Second, governments in developing 
economies often lack the institutional capacity to undertake appropriate revenue and 
expenditure analysis that should accompany rules-based fiscal policy making. Also, budgetary 
processes in most of the developing economies are still evolving, and ad-hoc budget cuts are 
much more common under such conditions. Third, increasing tax collection in developing 
economies is particularly challenging because of their large informal sector, weaker tax 
administration, and lower tax compliance. Therefore, most of the burden of meeting deficit 
goals falls on expenditures. 
Also, political scientists highlight that electoral cycles and collective action problems in 
legislatures are some of the key reasons for high deficits in democracies and parliamentary 
systems (Alesina & Passalacqua, 2015; Alesina, Perotti, & Tavares, 1998; Cheibub, 2006; 
Hallerberg & Marier, 2004; Hankla, 2013). Thus, if the fiscal rules are effective in countering the 
political budget cycles and collective action problems – then we should expect to see the rules 
reducing spending more in democratic political systems. Furthermore, if the rules are effective 
in countering collective action problems that arise in the legislatures – then we should see that 
fiscal rules are more effective in the parliamentary systems.  
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Based on these expectations, I formulate two broad hypotheses for this study.  
Hypothesis 1: The adoption of balanced-budget requirements leads to a disproportionate 
reduction in social sector spending (education, health, and social protection). 
 
Hypothesis 2: The negative impact of balanced budget rules on social spending is particularly 
high in developing economies, democratic countries, and parliamentary systems. 
 
2.4 DATA AND METHODS 
Cross-country datasets on fiscal rules and expenditures have improved substantially 
during the last few years, enabling meaningful cross-country comparisons. The IMF’s Fiscal Rules 
Database provides fairly comprehensive information on fiscal rules based on a review of 
legislative and budgetary documents (Bova et al., 2015; Lledó et al., 2017).6 Furthermore, the 
International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) compiles the Statistics of Public 
Expenditures for Economic Development (SPEED) database. It starts with the IMF’s 
Government Finance Statistics (GFS), but improves it by filling in missing observations using 
country budget documents and standardizes estimates to allow for meaningful inter-temporal 
and cross-country comparisons.7 In addition, I use information from several other publicly 
available databases for the control variables: World Development Indicators, Fiscal 
                                                            
6 Organizations such as OECD and the European Union maintain their data on fiscal rules for the member 
countries. The coding in the IMF and OECD database may differ since the IMF classifies a fiscal rule if it is 
considered binding for a minimum of three years and does not include pay-as-you-go targets (Schaechter et al., 
2012). However, IMF is the only source that provides a comprehensive coverage for developing countries. 
7 IFRPRI data covers 147 countries and reports expenditures using the Classification of Function of Governments 
(COFOG). There are two popular ways of classifying government expenditures: The functional classification and 
the economic classification. The functional approach (COFOG) classifies government expenditures based on the 
purpose, such as education, health, and defense. The organizational structure of governments across the countries 
varies substantially, and the structure varies over time within countries. Therefore, COFOG enables more 
meaningful comparisons of government outlays across countries and over time. On the other hand, the economic 
classification focusses on economic categories such as capital expenditure, transfers, and grants. 
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Decentralization Indicators, and Database of Political Institutions from the World Bank, and the 
Polity IV project. 
Across these models, the key dependent variables are different fiscal outcomes related 
to deficits, revenues, and expenditures. I begin with a simple analysis of the impact of fiscal rules 
on aggregate fiscal outcomes. I use three fiscal measures – fiscal balance, total expenses, and tax 
revenues – as dependent variables to examine the overall impact of balanced budget rules. To 
allow comparison across these indicators, I operationalize these variables as a percent of the 
gross domestic product. Next, I examine my primary hypothesis – that balanced budget rules 
reduce social spending. I classify spending on education, health, and social protection as social 
sector spending and use the natural logarithm of constant dollar spending, adjusted for 
purchasing power, as the key dependent variable in the spending specifications. To gain a better 
understanding of sectoral patterns, I also examine the impact of fiscal rules on individual 
spending categories: education, health, social protection, primary sector (agriculture, mining, 
and fuel), transport and communications, defense, and ‘other’ spending (includes general 
government expenditures). The main independent variable is a dummy for balanced budget 
rules that varies over country-years. 
I control for a variety of factors that may influence the dependent and key independent 
variables. First, I include a set of demographic variables to capture the demand for public 
services. The key variables in this category are log of total population, to account for overall 
demand, and the proportion of the elderly and children in the population, to account for 
dependency ratio, and for higher demand for social expenditures such as education and health. 
Second, I include a set of variables to account for economic conditions and resource availability 
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-  log of per capita gross domestic product to account for the size of the economy, economic 
growth in the previous fiscal year to account for growth in the available resources, and the 
unemployment rate to capture the economic performance and labor market situation. Third, a 
set of control variables capture the variation in the institutional environment and political 
system. These include a dummy coded one if the economic ideology of the government leans 
towards the left, a dummy for country-years with executive or legislative election to account 
for the political budget cycles. In all the spending regressions, I control for percent of 
expenditure by subnational government to account for fiscal decentralization – the transfer of 
spending authority from central to provincial governments. Finally, I include year dummies to 
account for business cycle effects. Table 2.1 provides the summary statistics for all the variables. 
The public expenditure database from IFPRI provides information for 147 countries. I 
begin by merging the expenditure data with the other data sources (Table 2.1). Given the 
nature of this data, I drop 41 countries that have outlier values on several variables that could 
only be attributed to reporting errors or extreme economic or political circumstances (e.g., 
extremely high surplus/deficits or economic growth/decline or no social spending for several 
years). In the reduced sample of 106 countries, several variables have missing information. 
Therefore, those observations drop out, leading to a final sample of 95 countries. Finally, the 
fiscal decentralization measure has several missing observations; therefore, when I control for it 
in the social spending regressions, I lose another one-third of the countries, leaving me with a 
final sample of 62 countries. Table 2.2 provides a list of all country-years that are included in 
the social spending regressions. 
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics 
 All Countries High Income Countries Middle and Low Income Countries 
Variable 
(Operationalization) 
(Source) 
Mean SD Min Max Mean SD Min Max Mean SD Min Max 
Fiscal Balance 
(% of GDP) 
(Source: WDI, World Bank) 
-1.80 3.88 -14.85 20.34 -1.54 4.52 -12.39 20.34 -2.00 3.28 -14.85 19.57 
Revenue 
(% of GDP) 
(Source: WDI, World Bank) 
24.49 9.79 3.26 51.70 30.45 9.37 3.26 51.70 20.38 7.74 4.57 49.30 
Expense 
(% of GDP) 
(Source: WDI, World Bank) 
25.42 10.32 2.81 59.07 31.22 10.39 4.15 54.57 21.04 7.80 2.81 59.07 
Social Spending 
(billion 2005 $ppp) 
(Source: SPEED, IFPRI) 
116.89 345.71 0.02 3885.29 227.45 496.40 0.32 3885.29 35.83 105.85 0.02 1335.33 
Education Spending 
(billion 2005 $ppp) 
(Source: SPEED, IFPRI) 
14.95 32.05 0.01 528.63 21.62 30.62 0.14 139.38 10.05 32.23 0.01 528.63 
Health Spending 
(billion 2005 $ppp) 
(Source: SPEED, IFPRI) 
14.05 36.63 0.01 335.43 27.45 51.78 0.01 335.43 4.30 12.02 0.01 180.30 
Social Protection 
(billion 2005 $ppp) 
(Source: SPEED, IFPRI) 
45.59 150.15 0.00 1730.21 91.84 217.80 0.03 1730.21 11.22 36.29 0.00 313.20 
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Primary Sector 
(Mining, Agriculture, Fuel) 
(Source: SPEED, IFPRI) 
4.86 18.53 0.00 417.89 4.94 7.62 0.00 56.67 4.84 22.83 0.01 417.89 
Transport and 
Communication 
(Source: SPEED, IFPRI) 
6.20 14.68 0.00 203.97 10.33 17.48 0.00 130.51 3.33 11.54 0.01 203.97 
Defense Spending 
(billion 2005 $ppp) 
(Source: SPEED, IFPRI) 
13.71 51.96 0.00 630.40 21.16 74.94 0.02 630.40 7.67 17.09 0.00 166.51 
Other spending 
(billion 2005 $ppp) 
(Source: SPEED, IFPRI) 
55.40 117.30 0.09 1323.95 78.75 134.22 0.34 785.58 40.44 102.43 0.09 1323.95 
Total 
(billion 2005 $ppp) 
(Source: SPEED, IFPRI) 
139.72 332.36 0.11 3235.93 248.54 455.41 0.80 3235.93 73.34 199.64 0.11 3134.46 
Balanced Budget Rule 
(1=Yes) (0=No) 
(Source: FAD, IMF) 
0.28 0.45 0.00 1.00 0.52 0.50 0.00 1.00 0.16 0.36 0.00 1.00 
Total Population 
(million) 
(Source: WDI, World Bank) 
54.18 163.82 0.19 1350.70 26.82 50.89 0.26 314.11 69.29 198.98 0.19 1350.70 
Percent Children 
(Age 15 or less) 
(Source: WDI, World Bank) 
29.51 10.53 13.13 51.79 20.05 5.06 13.13 45.25 34.73 9.02 13.36 51.79 
Percent Seniors 
(Age 65 or more) 
(Source: WDI, World Bank) 
8.03 5.14 0.70 24.29 12.67 4.68 0.70 24.29 5.47 3.22 2.18 18.98 
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Per Capita GDP 
(2011$ppp, Thousands) 
(Source: WDI, World Bank) 
16.45 17.28 0.35 114.52 33.97 17.77 8.27 114.52 6.73 4.94 0.35 24.88 
Economic Growth 
(%) 
(Source: WDI, World Bank) 
3.71 4.55 -29.59 34.50 2.88 3.39 -14.81 18.33 4.16 5.02 -29.59 34.50 
Subnational Exp. Share 
(% of total spending) 
(Source: WDI, World Bank) 
25.13 19.65 0.37 98.76 26.11 15.94 4.56 98.04 24.32 22.28 0.37 98.76 
Unemployment Rate 
(% of labor force) 
(Source: WDI, World Bank) 
8.13 4.86 0.70 29.80 7.86 4.07 1.50 25.60 8.27 5.24 0.70 29.80 
Left Government 
(1=Yes) (0=No) 
(Source: WDI, World Bank) 
0.29 0.45 0.00 1.00 0.32 0.47 0.00 1.00 0.27 0.44 0.00 1.00 
Election Year 
(1=Yes) (0=No) 
(Source: DPI, World Bank) 
0.28 0.45 0.00 1.00 0.30 0.46 0.00 1.00 0.28 0.45 0.00 1.00 
Parliament 
(1=Yes) (0=No) 
(Source: DPI, World Bank) 
0.40 0.49 0.00 1.00 0.73 0.45 0.00 1.00 0.21 0.41 0.00 1.00 
Democracy 
(1=Yes) (0=No) 
(Source: Polity Data Series) 
0.62 0.49 0.00 1.00 0.87 0.33 0.00 1.00 0.48 0.50 0.00 1.00 
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Table 2.2: Countries-Years Included in the Social Spending Regressions 
(Determined by the availability of all dependent and independent variables) 
 
Mid & Low 
Income Panel 
(N=34) 
Years Available High Income 
Panel 
(N=28) 
Years Available 
Afghanistan 2006-2011 Australia 1992-1997 
Albania 1995-1998 Belgium 1992-1998 
Argentina 1992-2001 Canada 1992-2007 
Azerbaijan 2008-2011 Chile 1992-2002 
Belarus 1992-2011 Croatia 1997-2011 
Bolivia 1992-2001 Czech Republic 1993-2011 
Brazil 1992-1994, 1997-1998, 2006-2011 Denmark 1992-2000 
Bulgaria 1992-2011 Finland 1992-1998 
China 2003-2004 France 1995-1997 
Colombia 1998-2000 Germany 1992-1999 
Costa Rica 2002-2011 Hungary 1993-1999 
Dominican Republic 1992-1996 Israel 1992-1999 
Ethiopia 2002 Italy 1995-1999 
Guatemala 1992-1993 Latvia 1997-2011 
India 1992-2009 Lithuania 1997-1999 
Indonesia 1992-1998 Luxembourg 1992-1997 
Iran 1999-2009 Netherlands 1992-1997 
Jamaica 2004-2007 Norway 1992-1999 
Jordan 2008-2009 Poland 1994-2000 
Kazakhstan 1998-2011 Portugal 1992-1994, 1995 
Kyrgyzstan 1998-2001, 2006 Republic of Korea 2006-2011 
Malaysia 1992-2001 Slovenia 1997-2011 
Mauritius 1992-1999, 2002-2011 Spain 1992-1997 
Mexico 1992-2000 Sweden 1992-1999 
Panama 1992-1994 Switzerland 1992-2008 
Peru 2004-2011 Trinidad and Tobago 1993-1995 
Moldova 2004-2011 United Kingdom 1992-1998 
Romania 1992-2001 United States of America 1992-2001 
Russia 1999-2001, 2005-2006   
South Africa 1995-1999   
Thailand 1992-2002   
Tunisia 2008-2011   
Uganda 1998-2003, 2004, 2007, 2010-2011   
Ukraine 1999-2011   
    
Note: Country Income classification based on GNI per capita (The World Bank Group) 
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In the first set of fixed-effects regressions, I begin by examining whether the balanced 
budget rules have the stated impact on fiscal balances, and how aggregate spending and tax 
revenues respond to the adoption of fiscal rules. The primary specification in fixed effects 
model assumes the form of equation 2.1, 
ݕ௜௧ ൌ ߛܦ௜௧ ൅ ࢼ࢞௜௧ ൅ ߙ௜൅ߤ௧ ൅ ߝ௜௧	            (2.1) 
where ݕ௜௧ is the fiscal outcome of interest, and ܦ௜௧	is a dummy for the balanced budget 
rule. The parameter ߛ measures the impact of the balanced budget rule on the fiscal outcome. 
All other covariates are included in the vector ࢞௜௧, and ࢼ is a vector of coefficients associated 
with the covariates. In addition, ߙ௜ denotes a full set of country dummies, ߤ௧ captures the time 
effects, and ߝ௜௧	is the error term with ܧሺߝ௜௧ሻ ൌ 0	for all i and t. 
Though the fixed effects estimator removes all the time-invariant country characteristics 
from the estimates, it arguably produces biased estimates since potential endogeneity is not 
completely ruled out. Furthermore, the social spending regressions may particularly suffer from 
a serial correlation problem, given the nature of the expenditure series. I follow Wooldridge 
(2003) and Drukker (2003) to examine the existence of serial correlation in the spending 
specifications and reject the null hypothesis of no serial correlation. To partially address this 
concern, we can modify the specification and introduce the lagged value of the dependent 
variable on the left-hand side of equation 2.1. However, such an approach leads to dynamic 
panel bias – the correlation between the lagged values of dependent variable (ݕ௜௧ିଵ) and fixed 
effects in the error term (ߤ௧) (Nickell, 1981). System GMM estimator introduced by Arellano & 
Bond (1991), Arellano and Bover (1995), and Blundell & Bond (1998) helps in addressing this 
issue. GMM estimator purges the fixed effects by differencing the data and uses lagged levels 
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and lagged differences of independent variables as internal instruments; therefore, addressing 
the endogeneity problem while avoiding the dynamic panel bias. 
Though the system GMM estimators are one of the more reliable estimators in this 
study area – they rely on strong assumptions about instrument validity (Roodman, 2009a, 
2009b). Therefore, for all the GMM specifications, I report the p-values for first-order (AR1) 
and second-order (AR2) autocorrelation and the Hansen J statistic. A well-specified model 
should reject the null for AR1 and fail to reject the null for AR2 and the Hansen test. Fixed-
effects and GMM estimators rely on different assumptions and have their unique advantages. 
The fixed-effects estimator is more transparent about its assumptions, but suffers from 
potential endogeneity and serial correlation problem. The GMM estimator, on the other hand, 
assists in addressing these problems, but since it uses lagged levels and differences to create an 
instrument matrix, it is less transparent. For most of the specifications, I report both the 
estimates, but when the fixed-effects and GMM estimate yield inconsistent estimates, the latter 
estimate is methodologically superior if the instrument validity assumption is met. 
To examine the patterns in sector-wise spending, I repeat the fixed effects and GMM 
models outlined above for eight key expenditure categories across developed and developing 
economies – which leads to several regressions. In order to represent these results in a concise 
form, I summarize the coefficients on the key independent variable – the dummy for balanced 
budget rules – in a graphical format with 90 percent confidence intervals in Figures 2.1 and 2.2 
and include detailed tables in the appendix (Tables A1- A4). In the end, I also test the political 
component of the second hypothesis – examining the variation in effects across democracies 
and parliamentary systems. I employ interaction terms for balanced budget rules and political 
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systems to estimate the plausible differences. Information on institutionalized democracy comes 
from the Polity IV Annual Time Series data, and countries with the democracy score of six or 
more are coded as institutionalized democracies. Information on parliamentary systems is 
available as a dummy variable from the World Bank’s Database of Political Institutions. 
2.5 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
In this section, I summarize the results of the empirical analysis in three parts. First, I 
examine the relationship between fiscal rules and aggregate fiscal outcomes – deficits, spending, 
and tax revenues. Second, I examine the key hypothesis – that BBRs lead to a reduction in 
social sector spending and examine sector-wise variation in the impact of BBRs. Third, I 
examine whether the political environment influences how BBRs impact social spending. 
 Table 2.3 reports the results from four sets of fixed-effects regressions examining the 
impact of balanced budget rules on fiscal surplus, expenses, and tax revenues. Columns 1– 3 
report the results for the full sample and columns 4 – 6 show the results for just the 
democratic countries. Columns 7 – 9 summarize the results for developing economies, and 
columns 10 – 12 summarize the results for high-income countries. The overall impact of 
balanced budget rules on fiscal balances is positive and significant, which suggests that the 
constraints imposed by balanced budget requirements are effective. The deficit-to-GDP ratio is 
0.9 percentage points lower in countries with BBRs, on average, than countries without BBRs. 
Column 4 shows the results for the subsample of democratic countries, and demonstrates that 
the impact of BBRs on budget balances is significantly stronger in democracies. Furthermore, 
BBRs significantly improve fiscal balances in high-income economies but have an insignificant 
impact on developing economies. There are two ways to interpret the insignificant impact in 
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developing economies: Developing economies may not be complying with the rule or they may 
not be able to improve their fiscal balances despite making an effort to meet the targets. A 
significant reduction in spending in developing economies (Column 8) provides some evidence 
for the latter explanation. BBRs also significantly reduce expenditure-to-GDP ratios in all but 
high-income countries. Typically, high-income economies have better budgetary frameworks 
and therefore the impact of fiscal targets is perhaps evenly distributed across revenue and 
spending. Furthermore, the effect of balanced budget rules on tax revenue-to-GDP ratio is 
insignificant across all the specifications. These results are also broadly consistent with the 
previous studies that find a positive relationship between fiscal rules and budget balances 
(Dahan & Strawczyski, 2013), and suggest that fiscal rules do not reduce public investment in 
industrialized economies, but do so in developing economies because of relatively weaker 
public financial management (Cordes et al., 2015). 
 Thus, BBRs appear to be effective in improving budget balances and cutting spending. 
Table 2.4 examines if the social spending cuts are the primary instrument that governments use 
to achieve deficit goals. The dependent variable is log of spending in constant PPP dollars. I 
exponentiate the regression coefficients (using the eform stata command) to convert them 
into expected percentage change – therefore, negative coefficients assume values less than one 
and positive coefficients assume values more than one. Columns 1 and 3 present the results of 
the fixed effects regressions and Columns 2 and 4 summarize the results for system GMM 
regressions.  
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Table 2.3: Balanced Budget Rules and Key Fiscal Outcomes (Percent of GDP)  
Country Fixed Effects, 1990-2012 
 Full Sample Democratic Countries Middle and Low-Income High-Income 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 Cash 
Surplus 
as % of 
GDP 
Spending 
as % of 
GDP 
Tax 
revenue 
as % of 
GDP 
Cash 
Surplus 
as % of 
GDP 
Spending 
as % of 
GDP 
Tax 
revenue 
as % of 
GDP 
Cash 
Surplus 
as % of 
GDP 
Spending 
as % of 
GDP 
Tax 
revenue 
as % of 
GDP 
Cash 
Surplus 
as % of 
GDP 
Spending 
as % of 
GDP 
Tax 
revenue 
as % of 
GDP 
             
Balanced Budget Rule 0.89* -1.90*** -0.01 1.20** -2.18*** -0.05 -0.09 -2.30*** -0.77 1.78** -1.31 0.84 
(1=Yes, 0=No) (0.52) (0.52) (0.44) (0.46) (0.61) (0.43) (0.47) (0.78) (0.65) (0.70) (0.80) (0.62) 
Population (Logged) -6.76* -0.62 -2.97 -8.35* 6.09 -4.99 -2.77 3.59 -1.60 -11.17** 1.95 -2.56 
 (3.99) (3.76) (2.25) (4.56) (6.12) (4.10) (4.89) (5.16) (3.79) (4.69) (5.37) (3.47) 
% Children -0.17 -0.16 -0.05 0.10 -0.40* -0.18 -0.23* -0.04 -0.04 -0.35 0.21 0.18 
 (0.12) (0.14) (0.09) (0.16) (0.24) (0.15) (0.13) (0.14) (0.11) (0.24) (0.24) (0.15) 
% Seniors -0.85 -0.05 -0.60*** -0.42 -0.28 -0.67*** -0.06 0.55 -0.26 -0.87 -0.17 -0.41 
 (0.53) (0.41) (0.22) (0.57) (0.48) (0.24) (0.66) (0.61) (0.44) (0.62) (0.50) (0.26) 
GDP (Logged) -0.27 4.06** 0.94 -3.45** 6.02* -0.23 3.55 1.89 0.42 -9.43*** 10.12** 0.02 
 (3.36) (1.93) (1.08) (1.63) (3.39) (1.58) (3.75) (1.73) (1.12) (2.70) (3.99) (2.49) 
Economic Growth 0.14*** -0.17*** -0.01 0.19*** -0.23*** 0.04 0.12*** -0.17*** -0.05* 0.11 -0.23*** 0.06 
 (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.07) (0.05) (0.04) 
Unemployment Rate -0.08 0.34*** -0.06 -0.15** 0.46*** 0.04 0.14* 0.16 -0.07 -0.31*** 0.47*** -0.05 
 (0.07) (0.09) (0.07) (0.06) (0.09) (0.06) (0.07) (0.11) (0.11) (0.09) (0.11) (0.07) 
Left Ideology 0.44* -0.15 0.80*** 0.43 -0.39 0.46* 1.29** -0.56 1.28*** -0.25 0.03 0.23 
 (0.26) (0.34) (0.27) (0.26) (0.39) (0.23) (0.54) (0.52) (0.36) (0.27) (0.51) (0.26) 
Election Year -0.24** 0.27*** -0.10 -0.27** 0.37*** -0.12* -0.28* 0.38*** 0.06 -0.22* 0.26* -0.22** 
 (0.10) (0.09) (0.07) (0.12) (0.11) (0.07) (0.16) (0.12) (0.10) (0.11) (0.13) (0.09) 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,479 1,546 1,615 1,021 1,046 1,082 820 879 946 659 667 669 
Number of Countries 94 96 97 68 68 69 58 60 61 36 36 36 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Robust standard errors in parentheses 
 
Notes: (1) All the dependent variables (Surplus, Expense, and Tax Revenue) obtained from World Development Indicators. (2) Democratic Countries 
are identified as the countries with institutionalized democracy index of six or higher in Polity 1V Annual Time Series. (3) Income classification based on 
GNI per capita (The World Bank Group) 
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Table 2.4: Balanced Budget Rules and Social Sector Spending, 1990-2012 
(Dependent Variable: Logged Social Spending, Exponentiated Coefficients)  
 
 High-Income 
Countries 
Middle and Low-Income 
Countries 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  
Fixed Effects  
 
System GMM  
 
Fixed Effects 
 
System GMM 
     
Balanced Budget Rule 0.913 0.954* 0.646** 0.806** 
 (0.092) (0.027) (0.121) (0.073) 
Population (Logged) 0.228 1.142*** 1.038 1.224*** 
 (0.377) (0.053) (1.729) (0.086) 
% Children 1.094 1.006 1.003 0.988 
 (0.129) (0.010) (0.021) (0.010) 
% Seniors 1.546*** 1.016 0.852 0.967** 
 (0.220) (0.017) (0.162) (0.015) 
GDP (Logged) 5.066* 1.429*** 2.422 1.296*** 
 (4.636) (0.155) (1.620) (0.101) 
Unemployment Rate 1.044* 1.015** 1.007 0.991 
 (0.024) (0.007) (0.020) (0.009) 
Economic Growth 0.999 1.005 0.994 1.002 
 (0.010) (0.005) (0.008) (0.004) 
Left Ideology 0.953 1.044 1.291 1.033 
 (0.114) (0.042) (0.278) (0.040) 
Fiscal Decentralization 0.995 0.994*** 1.002 1.000 
 (0.005) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) 
Election Year 0.986 0.974 0.995 1.014 
 (0.028) (0.026) (0.040) (0.032) 
Lag Social Spending  2.389***  2.154*** 
  (0.087)  (0.124) 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 243 240 284 275 
Number of Countries 28 28 34 34 
AR1(p-value)  0.016  0.019 
AR2 (p-value)   0.515  0.090 
Hansen (p-value)  1.00  1.00 
     
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Robust standard errors in parentheses 
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Across all the specifications, countries that have a balanced budget rule spend less on aggregate 
social spending. However, the results vary across the country-income groups and two 
estimation approaches. In the high-income panel, countries with a balanced budget rule appear 
to spend 95 percent as much as the countries without a rule in the GMM estimates. The fixed-
effects estimate is larger in magnitude and insignificant. Similarly, in the developing economies, 
countries with balanced budget rules spend 80 percent as much as the countries without a rule 
in the GMM estimates. The fixed-effect is also significant in this case, but the magnitude of 
coefficient seems to be an overestimate.8 
To examine the sector-wise trends, I examine the impact of balanced budget rules on 
disaggregated spending categories. Figure 2.1 shows the results of two specifications for 
developing economies and summarizes coefficients on the balanced budget rule dummy with 90 
percent confidence interval. Figure 2.2 does the same for developed economies, and detailed 
tables are available in the Appendix. As in Table 2.4, the fixed-effects estimates are larger in 
magnitude and have wider confidence intervals than the GMM estimates in both panels. Figure 
2.1 shows that the developing economies with BBRs reduce spending across most of the 
categories, but only two categories witness significant decreases – health and social protection. 
The GMM estimates for the middle and low-income countries suggest that developing 
economies with a fiscal rule, on average, spend around twenty percent less than the countries 
without the fiscal rule. Only one category – other spending which includes general government 
– carries a positive sign across the two estimates, but it is insignificant in the GMM estimates. 
                                                            
8 I also calculate the models without the fiscal decentralization control to check for possible bias introduced by the 
missing data. Larger sample and omitting fiscal decentralization changes the coefficients in some models, however, 
the overall findings remain consistent. For example, appendix Table A5 reproduces estimates in Table 2.4 without 
the fiscal decentralization control. The coefficients on the fiscal rule variable for high-income countries becomes 
insignificant, but for middle and low-income countries the results remain consistent and significant. 
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The only other spending category yielding significant impact is the primary sector spending 
which includes spending on agriculture, fuel, and mining. On the other hand, the results for 
high-income countries in Figure 2.2 resonate with the findings of Table 2.3 and 2.4. In the GMM 
specifications, developed economies show a significant decrease in total spending and only one 
subcategory – social protection. On average, developed economies with a fiscal rule spend 94 
percent as much as the economies without a fiscal rule. These results are consistent with the 
findings in previous studies like Dahan & Strawczyski (2013), which find a significant reduction in 
social transfers in OECD economies with the fiscal rules. Expenditure on health yields 
substantially inconsistent estimates across the two estimation approaches. Three categories of 
education, transport and communications, and ‘other’ spending yield positive but insignificant 
coefficients in the GMM specification. 
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Figure 2.1: Balanced Budget Rules and Sector Wise Spending in Developing Economies 
(Dependent Variable: Logged Sector Wise Spending, Exponentiated Coefficients) 
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Figure 2.2: Balanced Budget Rules and Sector Wise Spending in High-Income Economies 
(Dependent Variable: Logged Sector Wise Spending, Exponentiated Coefficients) 
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Next, I examine whether the effect of these rules varies under different political 
systems. As noted earlier, one of the primary reasons to adopt fiscal rules is to contain 
overspending due to collective problems in the parliamentary legislatures and electoral cycles in 
democracies. Table 2.5 summarizes the differential impacts of balanced budget rules on social 
spending in democratic and parliamentary systems. Fixed effects estimates in Column 1 suggest 
that democracies without a fiscal rule spend significantly more on the social sector than 
democracies with the rule. Furthermore, the effect of balanced budget rule on reduction in 
social spending is significantly more in countries that have institutional democracy vis-à-vis non-
democratic countries. Though the GMM estimate in column 2 also has the same sign on 
coefficients, it is not statistically significant. Similarly, fixed effects estimates in column 3 suggest 
that parliamentary systems spend more on the social sector than countries with non-
parliamentary systems. The negative coefficient on the interaction term is not significant in the 
fixed effects estimates. Furthermore, the GMM estimates also yield insignificant results. Overall, 
the fiscal rules appear to be more effective in democracies and parliamentary systems, but the 
results are not conclusive, since they vary across the two estimation approaches. 
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Table 2.5: Balanced Budget Rules and Social Sector Spending across Political Systems 
[Fixed Effects, Full Sample] 
(Dependent Variable: Logged Social Spending, Exponentiated Coefficients)  
 (1) 
 
Fixed Effects 
(2) 
 
System GMM 
(3) 
 
Fixed Effects 
(4) 
 
System GMM 
     
     
Balanced Budget Rule (BBR) 1.447** 0.996 1.071 0.969 
 (0.235) (0.095) (0.130) (0.042) 
BBR*Democracy 0.661*** 0.951   
 (0.102) (0.093)   
Democracy 1.276*** 1.009   
 (0.112) (0.053)   
BBR*Parliament   0.887 0.974 
   (0.134) (0.056) 
Parliament   1.265* 1.082 
   (0.161) (0.074) 
Population (Logged) 2.180** 1.107*** 2.492*** 1.119*** 
 (0.682) (0.040) (0.783) (0.044) 
% Children 0.980 0.997 0.984 0.996 
 (0.013) (0.003) (0.012) (0.004) 
% Seniors 1.073* 1.010 1.073* 1.004 
 (0.040) (0.007) (0.040) (0.008) 
GDP (Logged) 4.183*** 1.086 4.387*** 1.102 
 (0.975) (0.064) (0.983) (0.068) 
Unemployment Rate 1.019** 0.997 1.021** 1.000 
 (0.009) (0.006) (0.009) (0.006) 
Economic Growth 0.996 1.005 0.996 1.005 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) 
Election Year 1.003 1.008 1.002 1.010 
 (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) 
Left Ideology 1.010 1.011 1.011 1.012 
 (0.037) (0.020) (0.040) (0.019) 
Lagged Spending  2.461***  2.453*** 
  (0.066)  (0.068) 
Observations 1,675 1,657 1,719 1,701 
Number of Countries 92 92 95 95 
AR1(p-value)  0.000  0.000 
AR2 (p-value)   0.916  0.911 
Hansen (p-value)  1.000  1.000 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Robust standard errors in parentheses 
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2.6 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
Numerical limits on deficits and balanced budget rules change the institutional 
environment in which the policymakers operate – leading to a short-term focus on meeting 
targets. Furthermore, the pursuit of deficit targets may often translate to disproportionate 
expenditure cuts, particularly cuts in social spending. Using a large panel data on developed and 
developing economies, this study finds evidence that balanced budget rules reduce public 
spending more than they raise revenues. The distortionary impacts of fiscal rules on social 
spending are more prominent in developing economies than in developed countries – perhaps 
owing to more ad hoc budget making in the former and better budgetary processes in the 
latter. In the developing economies, health and social protection witness reductions in 
allocation. In the developed economies, education and health budgets are not affected, but cuts 
in social security expenditures do occur. Fiscal rules appear to be more effective in 
democracies and parliamentary systems, but the evidence is not conclusive. 
 Some limitations of this analysis need to be highlighted. First, the empirical design 
captures the existence of balanced budget rules using a dummy variable, which does not 
account for the substantial cross-country variation in the level of stringency of these rules. 
Second, fiscal rules are often adopted along with other reforms, which may introduce bias in 
the estimates, particularly in the fixed effects models. Third, the issue of underlying political and 
social preferences informing deficit and spending behavior has been a persistent theme in the 
political economy literature. Though the controls for economic ideology of government and 
country fixed effects help in addressing this issue, they may still be inadequate in capturing 
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underlying preferences. Lastly, cross-country panel studies often suffer from reporting errors 
and measurement issues that might also affect this study. 
In the end, it is likely that more countries will continue to adopt fiscal rules in the 
immediate future. However, when policymakers design these rules, they should consider 
mitigating the potential negative impact of these rules on social investment. For example, 
countries may consider excluding certain social investments and long-term public investments 
from the deficit targets. Developing economies may also consider meeting the fiscal targets 
over medium-term rather than annual fiscal targets. In countries that already have these rules, 
identifying revenue and expenditure policies that can assist in controlling deficits without 
compromising of long-term investments in human and physical capital will be integral in 
sustaining economic growth. 
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CHAPTER 3 
TIED TO THE MAST: 
Do Subnational Fiscal Rules Reduce Public Investment? 
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3.1 INTRODUCTION 
The last two decades have witnessed an increase in fiscal decentralization in many 
developing economies. Subnational governments are responsible for providing more public 
services and increasingly issue and manage debt and administer new taxes. However, the 
devolution of fiscal authority may also have led to an increase in the incidence of high 
subnational deficits in several countries. For example, the 1988 constitutional reforms in Brazil 
gave significant fiscal authority to states, and two major subnational debt crises occurred during 
the 1990s. A similar pattern exists in other developing economies (Liu & Webb, 2011). In 
response, several countries have adopted subnational fiscal rules or fiscal responsibility laws 
(FRLs) with an aim to promote fiscal discipline at the state and local level. Latin American 
countries adopted some of the notable FRLs towards the turn of the millennium (Brazil in 2000; 
Argentina in 1999; Peru in 2000). Subsequently, other developing countries have followed suit 
(India in 2003; Pakistan in 2005; Sri Lanka in 2003; Mexico in 2006). 
The increasing popularity of FRLs has motivated substantial research focusing on their 
impact on budget balances and fiscal discipline. However, limited research has examined how 
subnational governments meet the numerical fiscal targets, and especially how the composition 
of public spending changes in response to these rules. Using the Indian case, this essay focuses 
on the effect of subnational FRLs on the composition of public spending. I argue that the short-
term deficit targets change the institutional environment in which policymakers operate. In 
response, policymakers pursue austerity measures and expenditure cuts that disproportionately 
affect development spending and long-term investments in capital projects. The empirical 
results broadly support this thesis, and I find that the Indian states undertook significant cuts in 
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development spending after the adoption of the fiscal rules. Furthermore, it appears that the 
states have reduced their capital outlay and social spending after the adoption of FRBM laws. 
The rest of this essay proceeds as follows. In the next section, I provide a brief overview 
of previous research on subnational fiscal rules highlighting the rationale for their adoption and 
the impact on spending outcomes. Section 3.3 lays out the key hypotheses of the study. Section 
3.4 provides the details of data, variables, and empirical strategy. Section 3.5 summarizes the 
results. The last section discusses the limitations of the study and provides conclusions. 
3.2 PREVIOUS RESEARCH 
Traditional decentralization theory suggests that subnational governments are capable of 
efficient public spending decisions since they have better information on the preferences and 
needs of local jurisdictions (Oates, 1972, 2005). The implicit assumption is that the subnational 
fiscal institutions and the political process can alter the composition of public expenditures and 
achieve allocative efficiency (Granado, Martinez-Vazquez, & McNab, 2016; Grisorio & Prota, 
2015). However, fiscal decentralization may lead to coordination failures and moral hazard 
problems. The delegation of fiscal powers often leads to principal-agent problems, because 
subnational governments have more information on their financial condition and service 
requirements than central government (De Mello, 2000; Prud’homme, 1995). On the 
expenditure side, central governments cannot effectively monitor the efficiency of public 
spending, and local representatives may have an incentive to incur spending on populist policies 
that can maximize the probability of their reelection. On the revenue side, the subnational 
governments may underutilize the local tax base, leading to inefficiencies in revenue 
mobilization. If the decentralized system has significant vertical imbalances and relies heavily on 
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revenue-sharing mechanisms, the subnational governments have an incentive to free ride and 
underutilize their own-source revenues. This leads to typical common pool problems when the 
governments do not completely internalize the cost of their actions. Furthermore, after 
incurring expenditures or debt, the subnational governments tend to expect a bailout by the 
central government in the form of higher intergovernmental transfers and special fiscal 
packages. This is particularly prevalent in developing economies. The central governments 
cannot remain immune to consistent fiscal problems at the subnational level, since the problems 
in one jurisdiction may produce adverse externalities for other jurisdictions (Ter-Minassian, 
2007, 2015; Wildasin, 1997). Also, the central government cannot ignore consistent 
underprovision of essential public services in a particular part of the country because of socio-
political consequences. The bailout of subnational units by central government may ultimately 
lead to moral hazard problems, i.e., subnational governments wilfully engaging in a fiscally 
imprudent behavior because of soft budget constraints (Kornai, Maskin, & Roland, 2003; Qian & 
Roland, 1998; Rodden, Eskeland, & Litvack, 2003). In the long run, such subnational behavior 
affects overall economic performance and macroeconomic stability. 
 Such problems become particularly acute when the fiscal system has an inherent 
dependency on central transfers – a characteristic of public finance systems in most developing 
countries (Bahl, 1999; Oates, 2005; Rodden et al., 2003). In addition, the subnational 
governments also confront overspending problems due to political budget cycles and collective 
action problems in the legislatures. In such a scenario, theoretically, the existence of formal 
institutional arrangements or subnational fiscal rules can mitigate the suboptimal behavior of the 
state and local governments. Substantial research has focused on the relationship between 
subnational fiscal rules and fiscal discipline – broadly suggesting that, under a set of political and 
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economic conditions, subnational fiscal rules may lead to fiscal discipline and improve fiscal 
balances (Foremny, 2014; Grembi, Nannicini, & Troiana, 2015; Kotia & Lledo, 2016; Krogstrup 
& Wälti, 2008; Liu & Webb, 2011; Ter-Minassian, 2007). 
The relationship between fiscal rules and the composition of public spending has 
received less attention. National-level studies that have examined fiscal consolidation policies in 
OECD and Latin American countries find that numerical fiscal targets have adverse impacts on 
the composition of public spending (Calderón & Servén, 2012; Cordes et al. 2015; Dahan & 
Strawczyski, 2013; Easterly, Irwin, & Servén, 2008). Research on subnational fiscal rules and 
public spending in developing countries has been rather limited.1 Among the industrialized 
economies, several studies have examined the relationship between Tax and Expenditure 
Limitations (TELs) and public spending in the United States. These studies also provide mixed 
evidence on the relationship between TELs and various components of spending (Amiel et al. 
2014; Ballal & Rubenstein, 2009; Eliason & Lutz, 2015; Kousser et al., 2008; Shadbegian, 1998). 
Kousser et al. (2008) find that TELs are largely ineffective in controlling spending since the state 
officials find ways to circumvent the limits. Eliason & Lutz (2015) also find an insignificant impact 
while studying the impact of Taxpayers Bill of Rights in Colorado. Amiel et al. (2014) and Ballal 
& Rubenstein (2009) highlight that TELs may have an impact on spending outcomes but the 
results are sensitive to measurement and methodological issues.  
In the Indian context, previous studies suggest that the political economy of state 
finances provides ample opportunities for states to overspend, as they face soft budget 
                                                            
1 A few studies on Latin America that have studied the effect of subnational rules on infrastructure and related 
investments (De Mello, 2006) and other research has examined effect of subnational institutions on outcomes 
related to subnational borrowing (Martell, 2008; Martinez-Vazquez & Vulovic, 2016). 
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constraints (Bahl et al. 2005; Karmakar, 2016; McCarten, 2003). During the 1990s, Indian states 
went through a period of high fiscal stress, characterized by increasing expenditures and 
stagnant tax collections (Rangarajan & Prasad, 2013). Large deficits during the1990s prompted 
the development of a rule-based institutional framework to manage fiscal policy. The central 
government adopted the Fiscal Responsibility and Budget Management (FRBM) law at the 
national level in 2003. Subsequently, in 2005, the Twelfth Finance Commission mandated that 
states could avail the financial benefits of a debt-restructuring program only if they enacted 
fiscal responsibility laws.2 This led to the adoption of fiscal responsibility laws by all Indian states 
during the 2000s. 
Previous research on the Indian experience suggests that the adoption of FRLs by the 
states contributed to improvements in fiscal balances (Chakraborty & Dash, 2013; Reserve 
Bank of India, 2016; Roy & Kotia, 2017; Simone & Topalova, 2009). Chakraborty & Dash (2013) 
find a reduction in state fiscal deficits after the adoption of FRBM. Simone & Topalova (2009) 
highlight that central government transfers played a significant role in improving state finances 
after FRBM adoption. Chakraborty (2017) finds that the states have also achieved higher own-
tax revenue mobilization during this period, particularly due to the introduction of the value 
added tax (VAT). Roy & Kotia (2017) argue that high economic growth and expenditure 
control initiatives by the states, like modifying retirement ages and promoting voluntary 
retirement schemes, led to improvements in fiscal balances. A few working papers and reports 
also examine the spending impacts, but most of these rely on simple comparisons of trends. 
Chakraborty & Dash (2013) suggest that the states reduced their development spending after 
                                                            
2 Finance Commission is a constitutional body that is constituted every five years to determine the distribution of 
tax proceeds between the Union and the states. In the Indian federal structure, the states have major expenditure 
responsibilities but limited tax authority creating a significant vertical balance, which the Finance Commission seeks 
to address. 
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the adoption of FRBM. Chakraborty (2017) finds a reduction in capital outlays after the fiscal 
rule adoption. On the contrary, the Reserve Bank of India (2016) suggests that the composition 
of public spending changed after the adoption of FRBM, particularly with higher development 
spending and capital spending. 
In summary, several studies highlight the reasons for overspending by subnational 
governments. They argue that intergovernmental coordination problems, moral hazard due to 
soft budget constraints, political budget cycles, and common pool problems in legislatures, 
introduce deficit bias in fiscal policy, and fiscal rules may partially address this problem. Previous 
studies support the view that such institutional arrangements introduce fiscal discipline and 
improve budget balances. Fewer studies focus on the impact of the rules on spending 
composition, particularly in the context of developing economies. This study contributes to this 
literature and uses the Indian case to examine the impact of subnational fiscal rules on the 
composition of public spending. In the next section, I outline my key hypotheses about the 
impact of subnational fiscal rules on spending composition. 
3.3 RESEARCH HYPOTHESES 
Several political economy factors influence how governments respond to fiscal targets. If 
policymaking was a completely rational exercise, to meet the deficit goals, the policymakers 
would enact new taxes that minimize the excess burden of taxation or cut expenditures with 
lowest marginal social welfare. However, given the realities of everyday policymaking, such 
revenue and expenditure analysis is rare, much less its implementation. Particularly in the Indian 
context, several factors hinder a rational revenue and expenditure analysis to meet the goals 
laid out by the FRBM laws. 
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First, state governments in India are not fiscal sovereigns, i.e., they rely on the central 
government for a significant proportion of their revenue needs. Also, low tax compliance and 
weak tax administration severely constrain the ability of states to raise revenues. Thus, 
spending cuts are the most feasible way for the states to meet fiscal targets in the short run. 
Therefore, if they are complying with the fiscal targets, it likely that policymakers are using 
spending cuts to meet their goals. 
Second, spending categories, such as public sector wage bills and pensions are difficult to 
change, since public-sector jobs are unionized and employees are guaranteed lifetime 
employment and pensions. Similarly, manipulating spending on several subsidies (for example, 
agriculture, fertilizer, fuel) and debt service is difficult. Therefore, within the expenditure cuts, a 
reduction in budgetary allocation for development spending is perhaps one of the most feasible 
option to meet fiscal targets.3 
Third, demarcation of responsibilities between the central and state governments in 
India is fuzzy for some public goods, because (the seventh schedule of) the constitution keeps 
several governance functions in ‘the concurrent list’ – i.e., both parliament and state assemblies 
can legislate on these subjects.4 Arguably, state policymakers face weaker electoral 
accountability for public goods in the concurrent list. This may particularly manifest in 
expenditure cuts in education, health, and physical infrastructure.  
                                                            
3 In the Indian public finance system, total expenditure of the government is classified into three broad categories – 
non-development expenditure, development expenditure, and other expenditure. Many items related to general 
government such as wages are classified as ‘non-development expenditure’ and spending on items such as health, 
education, and infrastructure is classified as ‘development expenditure’. Third classification of ‘other expenditures’ 
includes items that are not included in these two classifications. 
4 Article 246 of the seventh schedule classifies legislative power into three lists union list (central government 
authority), state list (state government authority), concurrent list (both center and states have authority). 
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Lastly, budget-making institutions at the state level lack the administrative and technical 
capacity to examine the effects of different policy choices. Therefore, accounting for the long-
term impact of budget cuts and positive externalities of investment in social and physical capital 
is usually not feasible. This may further increase the likelihood of reduction in social investment 
and capital projects under the fiscal rules regime. 
All these processes often work in conjunction with the factors discussed in section 2.3, 
which may lead to a disproportionate reduction in development spending (particularly the 
subcategories of social expenditures and capital spending) in the aftermath of the adoption of 
fiscal responsibility laws. Based on these considerations, I formulate two key hypotheses for this 
study. 
Hypothesis 1: The adoption of FRBM laws by the Indian states resulted in a reduction in 
development spending. 
 
Hypothesis 2: The introduction of FRBM laws by the states resulted in a reduction in key 
development spending subcategories – social expenditure and capital outlay. 
 
3.4 DATA AND METHODS 
India is a federal union of 29 states and seven union territories. Eleven states with 
special category status receive a preferential fiscal treatment in the form of higher central 
transfers and aid because of the development deficits they face.5 Typically, comparative analyses 
of state finances do not include these states because of their unique fiscal status. Therefore, I 
                                                            
5 The concept of special category status was introduced by the fifth finance commission in 1969 to extend certain 
preferential treatment and tax breaks to a few states. The features of these states include hilly and difficult terrain, 
high tribal population, historical backwardness or strategic location near the national border. Currently, special 
category states are Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Himachal Pradesh, Jammu and Kashmir, Meghalaya, Manipur, 
Mizoram, Nagaland, Sikkim, Tripura, Uttarakhand. 
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restrict my sample to 17 Non-Special Category (NSC) States during 2001 and 2014.6 The state 
finance data for this study comes primarily from India’s central bank, the Reserve Bank of India, 
which annually publishes State Finances: A Study of Budgets. The state finance reports tabulate 
comprehensive information on budgetary components and a variety of fiscal indicators for 
Indian states. The reports combine information from state budgets with supplementary data 
from the Bank’s internal records and other agencies such as the Planning Commission and 
Ministry of Finance’s Indian Public Finance Statistics. In addition to the RBI, I obtain some 
information on fiscal indicators from the Ministry of Finance, IndiaStat, and EPW Research 
Foundation’s India Time Series. Furthermore, I obtain information on other economic and 
political variables from the Central Statistics Office (CSO), Census of India, Election 
Commission of India, and Hankla (2016). 
 Across the models, the key dependent variables are different fiscal outcomes related to 
deficits, revenues, and expenditures. I begin with an analysis of the impact of fiscal rules on 
aggregate fiscal outcomes. I use four key dependent variables – fiscal deficits, total expenditures, 
tax revenues, and non-tax revenues to examine the overall impact of fiscal responsibility laws. 
To allow for comparison across these indicators, I operationalize these variables as a percent of 
the gross domestic product. Next, I examine the first hypothesis – that the states reduced their 
development spending after the adoption of fiscal responsibility laws. I report the results for all 
three categories of spending – development, non-development, and other spending, using two 
measures – natural logarithm of spending and spending as a percent of GDP.7 The logarithmic 
                                                            
6 State of Telangana was carved out of Andhra Pradesh in 2014. For the period of this study, Telangana is part of 
Andhra Pradesh (11 special category states, 17 NSC states, and Telangana total to 29 states). 
7 Reserve Bank of India classifies the entire government expenditure into three functional categories – 
development, non-development, and other spending. This includes the expenditures in the revenue and capital 
account as well as loan and advances from the central government. Furthermore, since India practiced centralized 
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measure enables me to capture actual budget cuts within the expenditure classification 
(adjusted for inflation), and the expenditure-GDP ratio captures whether spending has kept 
pace with the state’s economic growth. To examine the second hypothesis, I examine the 
impact of fiscal responsibility laws on two subcategories of development spending – social 
expenditures and capital outlay.  
The primary dependent variable is a dummy for the existence of Fiscal Responsibility 
Law over state-years. Table 3.1 provides the timeline of FRBM adoption in the Indian states. I 
code the dummy variable as one from the fiscal years in which the rule was adopted.8 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
planning until recently these expenditures were disaggregated into the plan and non-plan components until 2014. I 
use total expenditures (both plan and non-plan) in my estimations. 
8 The Indian fiscal year runs from April 1 to March 31. 
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Table 3.1: Adoption of Subnational Fiscal Responsibility Laws by the Indian States 
State FRBM Law Adoption 
Karnataka September 2002 
Tamil Nadu May 2003 
Kerala August 2003 
Punjab October 2003 
Uttar Pradesh February 2004 
Gujarat March 2005 
Himachal Pradesh April 2005 
Maharashtra April 2005 
Madhya Pradesh May 2005 
Rajasthan May 2005 
Andhra Pradesh June 2005 
Odisha June 2005 
Tripura June 2005 
Haryana July 2005 
Manipur August 2005 
Assam September 2005 
Chhattisgarh September 2005 
Uttarakhand October 2005 
Arunachal Pradesh March 2006 
Meghalaya March 2006 
Bihar April 2006 
Goa May 2006 
Jammu and Kashmir August 2006 
Mizoram October 2006 
Jharkhand May 2007 
Nagaland January 2010 
West Bengal July 2010 
Sikkim September 2010 
Source: Reserve Bank of India
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 I control for a variety of factors that may influence the results. First, the log of total 
state population and real gross domestic product account for demand for services and size of 
the economy. Second, economic growth in the previous fiscal year accounts for changes in 
resource availability. Total internal debt and central government grants account for other fiscal 
resources that are available to the states.9 In the absence of social development estimates that 
change annually across the states, I use surface road density, i.e., length of the surfaced roads 
per square kilometer of state area as a proxy for the overall social development level of the 
states.10 Furthermore, I include a set of political variables – a dummy indicating years in which 
state or general elections are held to capture political budget cycles and a set of dummies 
indicating economic ideology of the political party in power. Election information comes from 
the Election Commission of India, and economic ideology is obtained from Hankla (2016). 
Finally, I include year dummies in all the specifications to account for business cycle effects. All 
the independent variables except elections and ideology are lagged by one year.11 Table 3.2 
provides the summary statistics for all the variables. 
 
                                                            
9 Intergovernmental transfers are a key component of state resources and have undergone a dramatic change 
during the last decade with an increased support for centrally sponsored schemes like Mahatma Gandhi National 
Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme. The central grants measure includes funds transferred for central and state 
plan schemes, centrally sponsored schemes, and non-plan grants. Omitting the central grants may introduce 
omitted variable bias in the deficit regressions. However, in the spending regressions it will rather lead to an 
underestimating the effect because more resources should ideally increase development and capital spending. 
10 In the Indian context, surface road density is usually a good proxy for social development level of a jurisdiction 
since the regions with better physical infrastructure also perform well on social indicators. For instance, Appendix 
Figure B1 shows high correlation of surface road density with poverty rate. The social development measures 
introduce significant measurement error since they are not available annually and can only be used with the 
assumption that estimates do not change during the intercensal period (Census of India provides only decennial 
demographic estimates and National Sample Survey Organization provides quinquennial poverty estimates). On the 
other hand, surface road density data varies across years and captures the annual changes in development levels. 
11 If we expect political budget cycles to exist then we should see the effect of elections on that year’s budget. 
However, the timing of elections is relevant – if the election is held early in the fiscal year, we should ideally lead 
the election variables. I ran alternative specifications with leaded election variable but the results do not change 
significantly. 
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Table 3.2: Summary Statistics (Non-Special Category States, 2001-2014) 
Variable Mean SD Min Max 
Fiscal Deficit (Percent of GDP) 3.26 1.78 -1.02 8.08 
Total Expenditure (Percent of GDP) 18.75 3.70 6.75 29.94 
Own Tax Revenue (Percent of GDP) 6.76 1.39 2.64 10.28 
Own Non-Tax Revenue (Percent of GDP) 1.98 1.69 0.25 14.51 
Development Expenditure (Percent of GDP) 11.26 2.72 4.53 18.98 
Non-Development Expenditure (Percent of GDP) 5.99 1.82 1.78 13.88 
Other Expenditure (Percent of GDP) 1.50 0.86 0.35 4.83 
Social Expenditure (Percent of GDP) 6.75 1.87 3.28 12.26 
Capital Outlay (Percent of GDP) 2.27 1.09 0.40 5.37 
Development Expenditure (Billion Constant Rupees) 206.20 143.94 14.38 709.33 
Non-Development Expenditure (Billion Constant Rupees) 107.03 69.81 6.12 352.39 
Other Expenditure (Billion Constant Rupees) 28.22 23.07 0.55 118.39 
Social Expenditure (Billion Constant Rupees) 124.47 88.65 6.67 464.38 
Capital Outlay (Billion Constant Rupees) 42.40 37.18 2.30 176.92 
FRBM Rule (1=Yes, 0=No) 0.66 0.48 0.00 1.00 
State Population (000s) 62168.82 43038.71 1357 213273 
GDP (Billion Constant Rupees) 1945.65 1491.05 95.91 8967.68 
Economic Growth  7.17 4.83 -9.90 28.67 
Total Internal Debt (Percent of GDP) 17.51 6.44 5.61 36.37 
Central Grants (Percent of GDP) 1.85 1.05 0.46 5.60 
Surface Road Density (Surfaced roads per square kilometer) 0.87 0.67 0.04 3.53 
Election Year (State or General Election) 0.37 0.48 0.00 1.00 
Left Ideology (1=Yes, 0=No) 0.12 0.32 0.00 1.00 
Centrist Ideology (1=Yes, 0=No) 0.45 0.50 0.00 1.00 
 
For all the specifications, I report the fixed effects and system GMM estimates. The primary 
specification of the fixed effects model assumes the form of equation 3.1.  
ݕ௜௧ ൌ ߛܦ௜௧ ൅ ࢼ࢞௜௧ ൅ ߙ௜൅ߤ௧ ൅ ߝ௜௧	            (3.1) 
ݕ௜௧ is the fiscal outcome of interest, ܦ௜௧	is a dummy for fiscal responsibility law. The parameter 
ߛ measures the impact of FRL on the fiscal outcome. All other covariates are included in the 
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vector ࢞௜௧ and ࢼ is the vector of coefficients associated with the covariates. In addition, ߙ௜ 
denotes a full set of country dummies, ߤ௧ captures the time effects and ߝ௜௧	is the error term 
with ܧሺߝ௜௧ሻ ൌ 0	for all i and t. 
Though the fixed effects estimator removes all the time-invariant country characteristics 
from the estimates, it arguably produces inefficient estimates, since potential endogeneity is not 
completely ruled out. Furthermore, the regressions may particularly suffer from serial 
correlation problem given the nature of the data. I follow Wooldridge (2003) and Drukker 
(2003) to examine the existence of serial correlation and reject the null hypothesis of no serial 
correlation. To partially address this concern, we can modify the specification and introduce the 
lagged value of the dependent variable on the left-hand side of equation 3.1. However, such an 
approach leads to dynamic panel bias – correlation between the lagged values of dependent 
variable (ݕ௜௧ିଵ) and fixed effects in the error term (ߤ௧) (Nickell, 1981). System GMM estimator 
introduced by Arellano & Bond (1991), Arellano and Bover (1995), and Blundell & Bond (1998) 
helps in addressing this issue. GMM estimator purges the fixed effects by differencing the data 
and uses lagged levels and lagged differences of independent variables as internal instruments; 
therefore, addressing the endogeneity problem while avoiding dynamic panel bias (Roodman, 
2009a, 2009b).  
Though the system GMM estimators are one of the more reliable estimators in this 
study area – they rely on strong assumptions about instrument validity. Therefore, for all the 
GMM specifications, I report the p-values for first-order (AR1) and second-order (AR2) 
autocorrelation and the Hansen J statistic. A well-specified model should reject the null for AR1 
and fail to reject the null for AR2 and the Hansen test. Fixed effects and GMM estimators rely 
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on different assumptions and have their unique advantages. The fixed effects estimator is more 
transparent about its assumptions, but suffers from potential endogeneity and serial correlation 
problem. The GMM estimator, on the other hand, assists in addressing these problems, but 
since it uses lagged levels and differences to create an instrument matrix, it is less transparent. 
For most of the specifications, I report both the estimates but when the fixed effects and GMM 
estimate yield inconsistent estimates, the latter estimate is methodologically superior if the 
instrument validity assumption is met. 
3.5 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
One of the primary rationales for the adoption of FRBM was to introduce fiscal 
discipline and reduce deficits of the states. The general consensus among Indian policymakers 
has been that FRBM was effective, since the average deficits of the states dropped sharply after 
the adoption of fiscal limits as shown in Figure 3.1.12 However, there was substantial variation in 
how FRBM affected deficits across the states as shown in Figure 3.2. The effect of FRBM on 
state deficits is much more prominent in some states such as Kerala, Punjab, and Uttar Pradesh 
that adopted FRBM on their own rather than waiting for the directions from the 12th finance 
commission. On the other hand, states like West Bengal, Chattisgarh, and Rajasthan reduced 
their deficits even before the adoption of the FRBM. Therefore, a simple trend analysis does 
not provide sufficient insight into the workings of FRBM, and it is important to examine the 
effect across different fiscal outcomes while controlling for observable state characteristics. 
                                                            
12 Deficit reduction at the national and subnational level after the adoption of Fiscal Responsibility Laws is a 
recurring theme of the recently released report of a committee that reviewed the FRBM framework in India 
(FRBM Review Committee, 2017). 
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Figure 3.1: Subnational Fiscal Deficits in India, 2001-2014 
(Special and Non-Special Category States) 
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Note: (1) Vertical line shows the year of FRBM adoption. (2) State of Goa not shown in the chart due to space constraints. Goa witnessed marginal deficit decreases after the 
FRBM adoption (May 2006) and before the Great Recession.  
Figure 3.2: FRBM Adoption and Subnational Fiscal Deficits of NSC States, 2001-2014 
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To examine the impact of FRBM on the full set of fiscal variables, I summarize the 
results of empirical analysis in three parts. First, I begin by exploring the relationship between 
the adoption of FRBM and major fiscal outcomes – deficits, spending, tax revenues, and non-tax 
revenues. In the second part, I examine the first hypothesis – that adoption of FRBM by the 
Indian states led to a reduction in development spending. In the third part, I examine whether 
the fiscal responsibility laws affected specific subcategories of development expenditure – social 
expenditures and capital outlay. 
Table 3.3 reports the results from four sets of fixed effects (FE) and GMM regressions 
examining the impact of FRBM laws on the fiscal deficit (Column 1-2), total expenditures 
(Column 3-4), tax revenue (Column 5-6), and non-tax revenue (Column 7-8). The FRBM law 
has significant negative impact on state fiscal deficits of the states across both the estimates, 
which suggests the constraints imposed by the FRBM laws were effective in reducing deficits. In 
the fixed-effects models, on average, the states cut their fiscal deficits by about 1.13 percentage 
points after the adoption of FRBM. In the GMM specifications, the effect is also significant but 
somewhat smaller at 0.81 percentage points. The impact of FRBM on total expenditure and 
revenue also has the expected signs, i.e., the states reduced their total spending and tried to 
improve revenue collections after the passage of FRBM. However, none of the coefficients on 
aggregate indicators are significant.  
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Table 3.3: FRBM Adoption and Key Fiscal Outcomes (Percent of GDP) in Indian States 
 Deficit Total Expenditure Tax Revenue Non-Tax Revenue 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 FE GMM FE GMM FE GMM FE GMM 
         
FRBM -1.127** -0.813** -0.795 -0.486 0.069 0.133 0.458 0.174 
 (0.452) (0.325) (0.543) (0.332) (0.164) (0.119) (0.442) (0.119) 
Population (Logged) 1.341 1.064*** -17.185* 2.137*** -3.959* 0.069 -17.755** -0.044 
 (4.658) (0.231) (9.290) (0.636) (2.252) (0.099) (6.439) (0.150) 
Real GDP  2.296 -1.164*** -4.726 -2.493*** -1.737 0.037 -2.856 -0.218 
 (1.863) (0.298) (4.526) (0.716) (1.426) (0.150) (2.764) (0.162) 
Economic Growth -0.013 0.005 0.022 0.043* 0.017 0.018** 0.002 0.001 
 (0.018) (0.016) (0.031) (0.022) (0.014) (0.008) (0.014) (0.009) 
Debt 0.024 0.002 0.013 -0.026 -0.010 -0.013** -0.067* -0.005 
 (0.062) (0.017) (0.072) (0.017) (0.017) (0.005) (0.035) (0.005) 
Grant -0.740*** -0.537*** 1.138** 0.062 0.248** -0.030 0.256 -0.067 
 (0.248) (0.116) (0.404) (0.240) (0.112) (0.039) (0.166) (0.067) 
Road Density 0.851* 0.240*** -0.246 0.573** -0.010 0.162*** -0.828 -0.175*** 
 (0.428) (0.078) (0.972) (0.244) (0.161) (0.047) (0.624) (0.067) 
Election Year -0.113 0.124 -0.015 -0.223 -0.094 -0.192** -0.004 -0.293** 
 (0.201) (0.153) (0.297) (0.305) (0.060) (0.077) (0.111) (0.138) 
Left Ideology -0.976 -0.179 -0.670 -0.572* 0.006 -0.220** -0.102 0.029 
 (0.568) (0.149) (0.660) (0.321) (0.141) (0.094) (0.353) (0.062) 
Centrist Ideology -0.597 -0.184** -0.517 -0.284 0.057 -0.168* 0.017 0.177* 
 (0.404) (0.074) (0.691) (0.295) (0.121) (0.087) (0.412) (0.107) 
Lagged Y  0.597***  0.628***  0.877***  0.733*** 
  (0.050)  (0.047)  (0.030)  (0.039) 
Observations 220 220 220 220 220 220 220 220 
Number of numeric 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 
AR1 (p-value)  0.003  0.002  0.004  0.144 
AR2 (p-value)  0.729  0.147  0.632  0.696 
Hansen (p-value)  1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses
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The next set of regressions examine whether the spending impact of FRBM varies 
across different subcategories of spending – development spending, non-development spending, 
and other spending. In Table 3.4, Column 1-6 use the natural logarithm of constant rupee 
spending as the dependent variables. This measure allows us to understand the inflation-
adjusted patterns in budgetary allocations and cuts. I exponentiate the regression coefficients 
(using the eform stata command) to convert them into expected percentage change – 
therefore, negative coefficients assume values less than one and positive coefficients assume 
values more than one. For example, Column 6 shows that, on average, the development 
spending after the FRBM adoption was 95.2 percent as high as (or 4.8 percent lower than) the 
pre-FRBM period. Concurrently, the non-development spending increased by 4.3 percent in the 
post-FRBM period (Column 5), and other spending showed positive but insignificant growth. 
Fixed effects models yield consistent estimates, but results are significant only for development 
spending. 
To understand the changes in spending composition in response to changing economic 
condition of the states, Table 3.5 reproduces the same specifications, but measures the 
expenditures as a percent of state GDP. The results in Table 3.5 are moreover consistent with 
Table 3.4. Development spending in the states has not kept pace with the economic growth of 
the states after the adoption of FRBM. As per the GMM estimates, the share of development 
spending in state GDP decreased by 0.81 percentage points after the adoption of FRBM 
(Column 4). At the same time, non-development and other spending witnessed a positive, but 
insignificant increase during the period. Overall, the results in Table 3.4 and 3.5 suggest that 
states have reduced development spending under the fiscal rules regime and it has not kept 
pace with the economic growth in the states. 
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Table 3.4 – FRBM Laws and Category-Wise Spending (Log of Constant Spending) 
(Dependent Variable: Log of Constant Spending, Exponentiated Coefficients) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Development 
Spending 
Non-Development 
Spending 
Other 
Spending 
Development 
Spending 
Non-Development 
Spending 
Other 
Spending 
 Fixed Effects Estimates System GMM Estimates 
       
FRBM 0.938** 1.058 0.998 0.952*** 1.043** 1.116 
 (0.028) (0.041) (0.108) (0.015) (0.020) (0.085) 
Population (Logged) 0.791 0.582 0.212* 1.097** 1.096*** 1.085 
 (0.312) (0.288) (0.179) (0.044) (0.029) (0.079) 
Real GDP  1.296 1.382 1.441 1.125** 1.215*** 1.471** 
 (0.288) (0.389) (1.073) (0.057) (0.082) (0.258) 
Economic Growth 0.997* 1.000 1.010 0.998** 0.998* 1.004 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.006) (0.001) (0.001) (0.007) 
Debt 0.985*** 1.015*** 1.035** 0.994*** 1.006*** 1.003 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.013) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) 
Grant 1.052** 1.026 1.090 0.993 1.001 1.051 
 (0.019) (0.023) (0.058) (0.013) (0.012) (0.048) 
Road Density 0.949 0.994 1.034 1.011 1.045*** 1.090** 
 (0.044) (0.070) (0.206) (0.018) (0.017) (0.046) 
Election Year 0.975 1.009 1.153** 0.981 0.988 1.128** 
 (0.021) (0.013) (0.065) (0.018) (0.016) (0.063) 
Left Ideology 0.907* 1.051 1.281* 0.948** 1.006 1.106* 
 (0.044) (0.044) (0.180) (0.024) (0.015) (0.063) 
Centrist Ideology 0.976 0.990 1.001 0.974* 1.004 0.937* 
 (0.038) (0.036) (0.094) (0.015) (0.013) (0.035) 
Lagged Spending    2.147*** 2.002*** 1.810*** 
    (0.130) (0.157) (0.185) 
Observations 220 220 220 220 220 220 
Number of States 17 17 17 17 17 17 
AR1 (p-value)    0.004 0.017 0.011 
AR2 (p-value)    0.134 0.204 0.109 
Hansen (p-value)    1.000 1.000 1.000 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses 
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Table 3.5 – FRBM Laws and Category-Wise Spending (Percent of GDP) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Development 
Spending 
Non-Development 
Spending 
Other 
Spending 
Development 
Spending 
Non-Development 
Spending 
Other 
Spending 
 Fixed Effects Estimates System GMM Estimates 
       
FRBM -1.121** 0.296 0.031 -0.818*** 0.175 0.218 
 (0.391) (0.266) (0.146) (0.195) (0.132) (0.149) 
Population (Logged) -6.780 -8.551 -1.855 1.280** 0.674*** 0.183 
 (4.046) (5.535) (1.303) (0.553) (0.209) (0.182) 
Real GDP  -5.026** 0.252 0.048 -1.566*** -0.738*** -0.069 
 (2.197) (2.153) (1.023) (0.606) (0.252) (0.228) 
Economic Growth 0.003 0.002 0.017 0.021 0.010 0.009 
 (0.022) (0.016) (0.012) (0.016) (0.007) (0.016) 
Debt -0.177*** 0.124*** 0.066*** -0.070*** 0.036*** 0.011 
 (0.044) (0.036) (0.019) (0.016) (0.013) (0.007) 
Grant 0.813*** 0.221 0.105 0.007 -0.039 0.065 
 (0.232) (0.192) (0.075) (0.186) (0.095) (0.091) 
Road Density -0.241 -0.088 0.083 0.229 0.242** 0.145* 
 (0.557) (0.464) (0.304) (0.240) (0.119) (0.082) 
Election Year -0.325 0.088 0.222* -0.228 -0.172 0.171 
 (0.211) (0.132) (0.112) (0.210) (0.152) (0.118) 
Left Ideology -1.304** 0.264 0.370** -0.660** 0.021 0.210* 
 (0.610) (0.285) (0.153) (0.274) (0.084) (0.126) 
Centrist Ideology -0.447 -0.050 -0.021 -0.271 0.116 -0.119 
 (0.467) (0.320) (0.095) (0.209) (0.082) (0.081) 
Lagged Spending    0.703*** 0.698*** 0.320* 
    (0.065) (0.102) (0.181) 
Observations 220 220 220 220 220 220 
Number of States 17 17 17 17 17 17 
AR1 (p-value)    0.005 0.179 0.006 
AR2 (p-value)    0.084 0.168 0.041 
Hansen (p-value)    1.000 1.000 1.000 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses 
56 
 
To identify the sectoral patterns within development spending, I run two additional sets 
of regressions using the sub-categories of social sector expenditure, and capital outlays as the 
dependent variable. Table 3.6 summarizes these results and reports both measures of the 
dependent variables: natural log of actual spending and expenditure-to-GDP ratio. Columns 1-4 
use natural logarithm of spending in these categories as the dependent variable and report 
exponentiated coefficients. Column 5-8 use the ratio of spending to state GDP as the 
dependent variable. The coefficients on social expenditures and capital outlay have the expected 
signs, but the results are significant for social spending at only 10 percent level of significance. 
However, when we use the expenditure-to-GDP ratios as the spending measures – it suggests 
that the social spending and capital outlay have not kept pace with the economic growth in the 
states. 
 Overall, the results suggest that the adoption of fiscal responsibility and budget 
management laws by the Indian states had a significant impact on state finances characterized by 
improved fiscal balances. In addition, FRBM adoption did not seem to improve revenue 
collection but did alter the composition of subnational public spending. To comply with the 
FRBM targets, states reduced their development spending while non-development components 
of the spending continued to grow. Furthermore, it appears that social spending and capital 
outlays have not kept pace with economic growth in the states in the post-FRBM period. These 
results are consistent with the previous studies that have found a negative impact of fiscal rules 
on social spending and capital investment in India and Latin America (Chakraborty, 2014, 2017; 
Serven, 2007). 
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Table 3.6 – Fiscal Rules, Social Spending, and Capital Outlays in the Indian States 
 Log of Constant Spending Percent of GDP 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         
 Social  
Spending 
Capital 
Spending 
Social 
Spending 
Capital 
Spending 
Social 
Spending 
Capital 
Spending 
Social 
Spending 
Capital 
Spending 
 Fixed Effects System GMM Fixed Effects System GMM 
         
FRBM 0.964 0.916 0.961* 0.951 -0.470** -0.378** -0.410** -0.306** 
 (0.027) (0.063) (0.021) (0.048) (0.220) (0.157) (0.178) (0.140) 
Population (Logged) 1.054 0.286 1.066** 1.125 -1.573 -1.162 0.692*** 0.356* 
 (0.552) (0.285) (0.029) (0.085) (3.594) (1.671) (0.207) (0.206) 
Real GDP  1.500* 1.932 1.124** 1.049 -1.873 -0.907 -0.790*** -0.358* 
 (0.294) (1.034) (0.057) (0.087) (1.490) (1.497) (0.237) (0.210) 
Economic Growth 0.997* 1.000 0.998 1.001 0.003 0.007 0.022* 0.010* 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.016) (0.008) (0.013) (0.006) 
Debt 0.990* 0.986 0.996*** 0.993** -0.071* -0.049** -0.033*** -0.016** 
 (0.005) (0.010) (0.001) (0.003) (0.037) (0.023) (0.011) (0.007) 
Grant 1.075*** 1.077* 1.015 0.998 0.705*** 0.268** 0.194** -0.005 
 (0.020) (0.041) (0.010) (0.027) (0.157) (0.113) (0.092) (0.081) 
Road Density 1.003 0.970 1.019* 1.020 0.206 0.084 0.195* 0.119 
 (0.052) (0.121) (0.012) (0.041) (0.392) (0.195) (0.102) (0.112) 
Election Year 0.976 0.966 0.978 1.018 -0.202 -0.187 -0.152 -0.030 
 (0.020) (0.064) (0.016) (0.048) (0.131) (0.142) (0.099) (0.087) 
Left Ideology 0.886* 0.794** 0.971 0.886* -0.920* -0.792*** -0.231 -0.322** 
 (0.053) (0.079) (0.020) (0.058) (0.478) (0.185) (0.158) (0.126) 
Centrist Ideology 0.971 0.971 0.981 0.978 -0.231 -0.120 -0.100 -0.078 
 (0.040) (0.044) (0.013) (0.028) (0.333) (0.142) (0.122) (0.067) 
Lagged Spending   2.248*** 2.289***   0.705*** 0.790*** 
   (0.151) (0.100)   (0.068) (0.050) 
Observations 220 220 220 220 220 220 220 220 
Number of numeric 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 
AR1 (p-value)   0.001 0.001   0.003 0.006 
AR2 (p-value)   0.521 0.489   0.142 0.628 
Hansen (p-value)   1.000 1.000   1.000 1.000 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses 
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3.6 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
In this essay, I examine whether the adoption of fiscal rules by subnational governments 
in developing economies impact the composition of public expenditures. I focus on the Indian 
experience and specifically examine the impact of fiscal responsibility laws adopted by the Indian 
states on development spending and the subcategories of social and capital spending. Using a 
combination of fixed effects and GMM estimation approaches, this study finds that the adoption 
of fiscal responsibility laws by Indian states influenced the composition of public spending. 
Among the major states of India, fiscal responsibility laws led to a small shift in spending from 
developmental to non-developmental purposes. Furthermore, social spending and capital outlay 
have not kept pace with the economic growth in the states after the adoption of fiscal 
responsibility laws. These results are robust to several alternative specifications and checks and 
are consistent with the previous studies in this area. 
However, studying the impact of the subnational fiscal rules on public spending in the 
Indian setting has its limitations. Indian states adopted the FRLs in the context of very high 
deficits and debt at the national and subnational level. The grim public finance situation led to 
the adoption of several other reforms in the mid-2000s. Some of the prominent concurrent 
events included the adoption of VAT by all the states, an increase in the devolution of central 
taxes by the twelfth finance commission, and debt relief and restructuring extended to the 
states. In addition, the period also witnessed robust economic growth in India and a liberal 
interest rate regime that could have a simultaneous effect on deficits, revenues, and 
expenditures. Arguably, all of these factors should have led to higher resources at the disposal 
of state governments, and therefore development spending should have increased, which is not 
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the case in the results. However, the omission of these factors may bias the impact on fiscal 
deficits, but isolating the effects of these factors is an empirical challenge.  
In India, a central government-appointed committee has recently completed a review of 
fiscal responsibility framework that recognizes the possibility of subnational fiscal targets 
distorting the composition of public spending – without any proposal for remedial steps (FRBM 
Review Committee, 2017). In the review committee’s consultations with the states, several 
states have highlighted the need for exempting certain public investment items from the FRBM 
limits – a plausible short-run policy option to counteract the adverse impacts in jurisdictions 
that already have such rules. Several developing economies are currently considering the 
adoption of similar fiscal responsibility laws. In these countries, the Indian experience should 
provide some impetus for careful examination of the impact of fiscal limits on the composition 
of public spending. 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE TYRANNY OF SUPERMAJORITY? 
Debt Market Impact of Supermajority Voting Rules in the U.S. State Legislatures 
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4.1 INTRODUCTION 
In the United States, regional variations in institutional arrangements provide a fertile 
ground for practitioners and researchers to study the intended and unintended effects of 
different fiscal institutions. Previous research has focused on numerical fiscal rules, such as tax 
and expenditure limits, deficits rules, and balanced budget requirements.1 Procedural fiscal rules, 
such as supermajority voting requirements and voter approvals for tax increases have also 
received substantial attention, but largely in the context of their intended effects on taxes and 
spending (Gradstein 1999; Knight 2000; Kioko and Martell 2012; Bradbury and Johnson 2006; 
Lee 2014; Seljan 2015). This article focuses on the unintended effects of supermajority 
requirements on the borrowing costs of state governments, an issue that has received little 
attention in previous studies. 
Sixteen states require a supermajority vote for any tax increase, i.e., more than a simple 
majority for passing any measure that would lead to an increase in tax (Table 1).2 Seven of 
them, constitutionally require a supermajority vote in each house to enact any bill that would 
lead to a tax increase. With the changing political and ideological composition of state 
legislatures, several states continue to discuss the merits and demerits of adopting such rules. 
The Wisconsin legislature passed a statutory supermajority rule in 2011 and subsequently 
adopted a legislatively-referred constitutional amendment which awaits voter approval 
                                                            
1 See Poterba 1994; Alesina and Perotti 1996; Poterba 1996; Besley and Case 2003 for some early discussions on 
state fiscal institutions. The Symposium on Tax and Expenditure Limitations (2004), Public Budgeting and Finance, 
24(4) provides an overview of early research on state and local TELs. See Hou and Smith (2010); Smith and Hou 
(2013) for some recent discussions on balanced budget rules. 
2 The tax revolt of 1970s and other developments like passing of Voting Rights Act of 1965 led to some states 
adopting the supermajority requirements, but only six states had supermajority requirements before 1990. Among 
these, Arkansas adopted a supermajority requirement after the Great Depression in November, 1934. Most of the 
other states with the supermajority rule adopted it in the nineties. 
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(Wisconsin State Legislature 2011; 2013). In recent years, at least ten other states (Idaho, 
Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New York, Nebraska, New Jersey, Hawaii, and 
West Virginia) have considered similar requirements (Henchman, 2012; Leachman, Johnson, & 
Grundman, 2012; Minnesota Budget Project, 2012; New Hampshire Fiscal Policy Institute, 2015; 
State of Hawaii, 2015). 
Table 4.1: Supermajority Rules for Tax Increases in the United States 
State Year of adoption 
Size of the 
requirement Application of the rule Legal status 
Arkansas 1934 3/4 Majority of Taxes Statutory 
Louisiana 1966 2/3 Majority of Taxes Constitutional  
Mississippi 1970 3/5 Majority of Taxes Constitutional  
Florida 1971 3/5 Corporate Income Tax  Statutory 
California 1979 2/3 Majority of Taxes Constitutional  
Delaware 1980 3/5 All Taxes Constitutional  
Arizona 1992 2/3 All taxes Constitutional  
Colorado 1992 2/3 All Taxes Statutory 
Oklahoma 1992 3/4 All Taxes Statutory 
Washington 1993 2/3 All Taxes Statutory 
Missouri 1996 2/3 Selected Taxes Statutory 
Nevada 1996 2/3 All Taxes Statutory 
Oregon 1996 3/5 All Taxes Constitutional  
South Dakota 1996 2/3 All Taxes Statutory 
Montana 1998 3/4 Selected Taxes Statutory 
Wisconsin 2011 2/3 Selected Taxes Statutory 
Source: National Conference of State Legislatures 
 
In the public finance context, one of the early discussions of supermajority requirements 
for tax increases is found in The Calculus of Consent. Buchanan & Tullock (1962) argue that two-
thirds majority “can be more representative and reduce the tyranny of the majority,” since it 
63 
 
can reduce the taxes and expenditures that are not agreeable to all social groups.3 The 
proponents of supermajority requirements argue that making it more difficult for legislators to 
enact tax increases ensures that taxes are raised only with broad bipartisan support. Critics, 
however, argue that such rules make even the day-to-day tax reform a cumbersome process, 
and can even lead to a minority coalition dominating the legislative process by obstructing the 
majority consensus. Furthermore, the supermajority requirements signal to the market that the 
jurisdiction has to overcome additional political hurdles to pass a tax increase, which may affect 
the cost of borrowing from the bond market. 
Several studies have examined the political aspects and effects of supermajority 
requirements on outcomes such as overall tax burden (Bradbury & Johnson, 2006; Knight, 
2000; Lee, 2015; Lee, 2014; Seljan, 2015). This article focuses on the effect of supermajority 
rules on subnational borrowing costs, an issue that has received little attention. Previous 
research suggests that fiscal rules that impose constraints on the budgetary process may change 
the risk associated with debt issued by the governments and thereby may influence the credit 
rating and borrowing costs (Capeci 1994; Johnson and Kriz 2005; Poterba and Rueben 1999a; 
Lowry and Alt 2001; Moldogaziev, Kioko, and Hildreth 2016; Feld et al. 2013). In this essay, I 
examine whether the procedural rules such as supermajority rules also have a similar effect. 
The rest of the essay proceeds as follows. Section 4.2 provides a background of existing 
research on supermajority voting requirements and fiscal outcomes. Section 4.3 discusses the 
role of fiscal institutions in municipal bond market and lays out the analytical framework of the 
                                                            
3The constitutional debate on supermajority requirements goes back to the Federalist Papers. See Ackerman et al. 
(1995) and McGinnis and Rappaport (1995) for an overview of constitutional arguments for and against the 
supermajority rules written in the context of proposal in the House of Representatives to amend the constitution 
to adopt supermajority rules. The bill was defeated in 1996. 
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study. Section 4.4 provides an overview of the data sources and variables, and Section 4.5 
discusses the details of estimation and results. The last section summarizes the findings and 
concludes. 
4.2 SUPERMAJORITY RULES AND FISCAL OUTCOMES 
Previous studies on supermajority rules have mostly focused on the impact of these 
requirements on taxes and expenditures. The central thesis of this literature is that the choice 
of voting rules and distribution of voting powers across different social groups influences the 
distribution of the tax burden and budgetary allocations (Buchanan and Tullock 1962; Lee 2014; 
Lee, Borcherding, and Kang 2014; Dixit, Grossman, and Gul 2000). A set of interest groups 
(e.g., business coalitions) hope to limit the government’s ability to increase taxes, while other 
groups (e.g., progressive social movements) want higher expenditure commitments from the 
government, which would lead to future tax increases. Gradstein (1999) suggests that, in the 
19th century, disenfranchisement restrained the latter group, by limiting political participation 
and containing the demand for redistribution. However, the expansion of universal franchise led 
to strengthening of the welfare state, an increase in taxes, and a parallel increase in demand for 
mechanisms to lower taxes by the former groups. Gradstein suggests that supermajority 
requirements for tax increases gained prominence in this context, and he outlines a theoretical 
model that argues that supermajority requirements can make tax increases difficult. 
Knight (2000) empirically tests the tax reduction hypothesis and examines the effect of 
state-level supermajority requirements on tax rates using fixed effects and instrumental variable 
estimation. He finds that the supermajority requirements are effective in reducing taxes, and 
the results are stronger in his instrumental variable models. Some other studies have also found 
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similar results for tax burden, using other approaches and case studies of individual states (Lee 
2014; Besley and Case 2003; Jordan and Hoffman 2009; Kioko and Martell 2012; Rafool 1996). 
For example, Kioko and Martell (2012) find that supermajority and voter approval requirements 
impose additional political constraints on governments and limit their ability to increase or 
impose taxes. Further, Lee (2014) uses the synthetic control method to demonstrate that 
California’s supermajority requirements reduced the non-property tax burden by an average of 
$1.44 per $100 of personal income. However, some studies find mixed results or no effect of 
supermajority rules. For example, Bradbury and Johnson (2006) use state-level data from 1960-
1997 and find no significant effect of supermajority rules on government revenues.  
The research on the effect of supermajority rules on spending is less clear. Some of the 
early studies on the subject find lower spending growth in the states with supermajority rules, 
but the recent literature shows mixed results (Crain and Miller 1990; Gabel and Hager 2000; 
Lee, Borcherding, and Kang 2014). Supermajority requirements may affect spending through 
two key mechanisms. First, by imposing constraints on increasing taxes, they should reduce 
overall spending (Buchanan & Tullock, 1962). On the other hand, to get minority legislators to 
vote on tax legislations, they have to give them more funds (pork barrel) that eventually inflates 
the budgets (Gabel and Hager 2000; Lee et al. 2014; Lee 2015). Lee et al. (2014) find empirical 
evidence that the second effect dominates and that states with supermajority requirements 
experience an increase in spending. 
These studies have focused on the effect of supermajority rules on taxes and spending, 
but the role of supermajority requirements in the municipal bond market has received little 
empirical attention. Recent studies that have examined the relationship between fiscal 
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institutions, credit ratings, and subnational borrowing have paid little or no attention to 
supermajority rules (Johnson & Kriz, 2005; Lowry & Alt, 2001; Poterba & Von Hagen, 1999; 
Stallmann, Deller, Amiel, & Maher, 2012). In the next section, I discuss the literature on fiscal 
institutions and borrowing costs in the municipal bond market and outline the analytical 
framework of this article. 
4.3 FISCAL INSTITUTIONS AND THE COST OF SUBNATIONAL BORROWING  
Fiscal institutions and economic characteristics of the bond issuer may have a significant 
effect on yields and borrowing costs (Capeci 1994; Poterba and Rueben 1999; Poterba and 
Rueben 1999; Johnson and Kriz 2005; Lowry and Alt 2001; Feld et al. 2013; Wagner 2004; 
Stallmann et al. 2012). In the 1980s, some studies focused on the correlation between the 
economic characteristics of bond issuers and cross-sectional variation in the yields (Wallace 
1981; Benson et al., 1984; 1986 Wilson and Howard 1984). However, as the debate around 
fiscal institutions like the Taxpayer’s Bill of Rights (TABOR) in the U.S. and the Maastricht 
Treaty in Europe gained prominence, institutional arrangements and their market effects 
received attention in the 1990s (Bayoumi, Morris, & Woglom, 1995; Capeci, 1994; Eichengreen 
& Bayoumi, 1994; Lowry & Alt, 2001; Poterba & Rueben, 1999). 
Capeci (1994) examined data from New Jersey municipalities and found that local 
borrowing costs were positively related to the debt burden and size of the current-year bond 
issues. Studies that examined interstate variations in the yields used the Chubb Relative Value 
Survey (CRVS) and found that institutions such as balanced budget rules, tax and expenditure 
limits, and budget stabilization funds influenced the yields on municipal bonds (Bayoumi, Morris, 
and Woglom 1995; Eichengreen and Bayoumi 1994; Poterba and Rueben 1999; Lowry and Alt 
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2001; Wagner 2004). Using the CRVS, Poterba & Rueben (1999a) find that bonds issued by 
states with limits on taxes pay a higher borrowing cost. Similarly, Lowry & Alt (2001) found that 
fiscal rules like balanced budget requirements serve as a signaling mechanism in the bond 
market and affect the market response. However, the lack of data on actual issues constrained 
these studies, since the CRVS data had a significant limitation – it was just a measure of the 
trader’s opinions on bond yields and not actual trades. Johnson and Kriz (2005) were to first to 
examine the impact of state fiscal institutions on credit ratings and borrowing costs in the 
primary market using official statement data. They found that debt limits and revenue limits 
increase borrowing costs, and spending limits and balanced budget rules reduce borrowing 
costs. They also found similar effects of these institutions on credit ratings, a finding that has 
been supported by subsequent studies that have used long-term datasets on state institutions 
and credit ratings (Grizzle, 2010; Moldogaziev & Guzman, 2015; Stallmann et al., 2012). 
Hypotheses. In summary, institutions that increase the perceived default risk, such as tax 
limits, lower the credit ratings and lead to higher borrowing costs (Johnson and Kriz 2005; 
Moldogaziev, Kioko, and Hildreth 2016). On the other hand, the institutions that decrease the 
perceived default risk, such as budget stabilization funds and balanced budget requirements, may 
have a positive effect on the credit ratings and lead to lower borrowing costs (Grizzle, 2010; 
Johnson & Kriz, 2005; Wagner, 2004). Supermajority rules make tax increases difficult. Thus, 
they should increase the perceived default risk for investors and credit rating agencies.  
Using CRVS, Poterba and Rueben (1999a) find an unclear relationship between fiscal 
institutions and borrowing costs. However, market observers, including the rating agencies such 
as Moody’s have noted the association of supermajority requirements with borrowing costs 
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(Leachman et al., 2012; Moody’s Investor Service, 2011). Credit ratings are one of the key 
factors that affect borrowing cost; therefore, they serve as an important intervening 
mechanism. However, lower credit ratings may impact the state governments beyond 
borrowing costs in the primary market. Thus, it is also useful to examine the impact of 
supermajority requirements on credit ratings and borrowing costs, separately and 
simultaneously. The first hypothesis of this study examines the impact of supermajority 
requirements on credit ratings of general obligation bonds issued by state governments. In the 
second hypothesis, I examine the impact of supermajority requirements on the cost of 
borrowing for state governments. 
Hypothesis 1: Supermajority requirements lower the credit ratings of state general 
obligation bonds. 
Hypothesis 2: Supermajority requirements increase the borrowing cost of the general 
obligation debt of state governments. 
4.4 DATA AND METHODS 
The previous section highlighted the limitations of the Chubb Relative Value Survey that 
informs most of the literature in this area. In recent years, the availability of data on actual debt 
market transactions has improved, as the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board and other 
private sector organizations have started to compile data in research-friendly format. This study 
uses two such municipal securities databases from Mergent, Inc. and Ipreo, Inc. These sources 
have same information, but each has some unique variables. For example, only the Ipreo 
database includes information on interest cost. Each maturity of a municipal issue has a unique 
identifier called a CUSIP (Committees on Uniform Securities Identification Procedures), which 
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could be used to match securities across datasets. These databases contain a range of 
information on the characteristics of issues and maturities, and identifying information of the 
issuer. State governments issue two key types of bonds – general obligations bonds, backed by 
full faith and credit of the state, and revenue bonds, backed by revenues from a specific project. 
Since the general obligation bonds (GOs) are funded through tax revenues, the supermajority 
requirements may limit a state’s ability to repay them – therefore, impacting their ratings and 
borrowing costs. On the other hand, user fee is the primary funding method for revenue bonds 
which is often outside the purview of legislative policymaking, and thus, they should not to be 
influenced by supermajority requirements.4 Therefore, I restrict the sample to only the GOs 
issued by state governments between 2001 and 2014 and combine bond issues with information 
on state characteristics from the Census Bureau and legislative variables from the National 
Conference of State Legislatures. 
One of the key challenges in the study of fiscal rules is the possibility of bias in estimates, 
since underlying political and citizen preferences affect the adoption of rules and observed 
outcomes (Poterba & Von Hagen, 1999; Rose, 2010). In the absence of opportunities to use 
quasi-experimental approaches, one way to partially reduce bias in the estimates is to control 
for observable political conditions and voter preferences (Krogstrup & Wälti, 2008; Poterba & 
Von Hagen, 1999). Furthermore, a growing body of literature highlights the impact of political 
institutions on municipal financing costs (Abakah & Kedia, 2016; Aneja, Moszoro, & Spiller, 
2015; Gao & Qi, 2013). Therefore, I include a set of political variables in the regressions. First, I 
control for political ideology of the state governments, since it influences the fiscal behavior and 
                                                            
4 In the sample, very small number of revenue bonds are issued by state government directly since governments 
rely on conduit agencies or special authorities to issue these bonds. Therefore, it is not possible to examine 
whether supermajority requirements have a direct impact of state-issued revenue bonds. 
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the institutions they adopt. Berry and Ringquist (1998) and Berry et al. (2010) provide an index 
of liberalism of the American states’ citizens and legislators, which I use as a measure of 
ideological variation in the political and voter preferences. Second, a plausible political 
motivation behind the supermajority requirements is to limit the fiscal maneuvering space for 
opposition parties, particularly in the states that are electorally volatile (or swing states). 
Therefore, I include a dummy variable for political competition that is coded one if the 
percentage of Democrats in the house is between 45 and 55 percent.5 Third, I include a dummy 
for party affiliation of the Governor to account for gubernatorial preferences. I obtain the 
information on these political variables from the National Conference of State Legislatures 
(NCSL). The information on supermajority rules also come from the NCSL, but I verify it with 
other recent studies on the subject (Lee 2014; Lee 2015; Heckelman and Dougherty 2010).  
I include unlimited tax GOs, limited tax GOs, and double-barreled bonds in the sample. 
Unlimited-tax bonds are backed by unlimited tax authority of the state. Limited Tax GOs are 
subject to state-specific legal limits on raising taxes. Double-barreled bonds are GO bonds that 
are first secured by designated source of revenue as well as the full-faith and credit pledge of 
issuer. All these bonds qualify as the general obligation debt of the state governments. The final 
sample comprises of 931 state GO bonds. Figure 4.1 and 4.2 summarize the distribution of the 
sample across states and years.
                                                            
5 Political Science literature uses more robust measures of electoral volatility and stability, but long-term volatility 
data on U.S. states is not readily available. Arguably, classifying the states with 45 to 55 percent representation of 
one political party as relatively more volatile is a valid assumption in the context of U.S. state politics. 
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Figure 4.1 - Distribution of the  General-Obligation Issues across States (N=931) 
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Figure 4.2: Distribution of the General-Obligation Issues across Years (N=931) 
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The key independent variable is a dummy for supermajority requirement and I have two 
sets of dependent variables. First, I use credit ratings to examine whether the bond issued by 
states with supermajority requirements receive lower ratings. The sample consists of state 
governments’ general obligation bonds, which typically receive high credit ratings. Therefore, I 
reorganize the ratings on an eight-point scale as shown in Table 4.2, where all the bonds 
receiving less than A3/A- are coded one and the ones with AAA are coded eight. I further 
recode these eight categories into three ratings of low, medium, and high which are used as the 
dependent variable in the ordered logit regressions.6 Second, I use the True Interest Cost (TIC) 
of the bond as my dependent variable to estimate the effect of supermajority requirements on 
borrowing cost. TIC is a widely-used measure of the total cost of capital for a bond issuer and 
estimates the present value of all the interest that the issuer will pay over the life of the bond.7  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
6 The three-point scale enables as easy interpretation of the results and also provides enough observations across 
the rating thresholds. 
7 Securities Rulemaking Board defines TIC as “the rate necessary to discount the amounts payable on the 
respective principal and interest payment due to the purchase price received for the new issue of bonds”. Another 
method of calculating interest expense is Net Interest Cost (NIC) which is slightly different from TIC since it does 
not consider the time value of money. 
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Table 4.2: Credit Rating Classification of the State G.O.s in the Sample 
Credit Rating Eight-Point Scale Three-Point Scale Observations 
Aaa/AAA 8 High  362 
Aa1/AA+ 7 Medium 260 
Aa2/AA 6 Medium 175 
Aa3/AA- 5 Low 84 
A1/A+ 4 Low 17 
A2/A 3 Low 15 
A3/A- 2 Low 7 
Baa1/BBB+ or lower 1 Low 11 
   Total=931 
Note: The eight-point scale is constructed after taking an average of ratings across the three agencies: 
Moody’s, S&P, and Fitch. If any two rating agencies assign different ratings to an issue, then average  
rating is rounded off to the nearest whole number. For example, if Moody’s assigns Aa1 to a bond,  
and S&P and Fitch assign AA, the bond will have an average rating of (7+6+6)/3=6.33,  
which will assume the value six on the eight-point scale, and ‘medium’ on the three-point scale. 
 
I control for a range of variables related to bond issues, issuers, and the political climate. 
The first set controls for characteristics of the bonds that are known to affect the credit rating 
and borrowing costs (Johnson & Kriz, 2005; Marlowe, 2013; Moldogaziev et al., 2016). Logged 
par value of the bond controls for the size of the bond. Since tax-exempt status of the bond is 
known to affect the demand of bond by the market, I include two dummies for whether 
interest on the bond is exempted from federal and state income taxes. Underwriter selection 
process may also impact the borrowing costs. A large literature shows that the method of sale, 
i.e. whether the underwriter is chosen through competitive bidding or negotiated agreement 
may influence the borrowing costs (Kriz, 2003; Peng & Brucato, 2004; Simonsen & Robbins, 
1996). Thus, I control for method of sale using a dummy for competitive sales. Third party 
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insurance provides additional protection to bonds and may affect borrowing costs and; 
therefore, I include a dummy for bond insurance.8 Long-term debt typically has higher 
borrowing costs; therefore, I control for bonds that have maturities of more than ten years. 
Finally, since issuers can redeem some bonds before the stated maturity period (i.e., call back 
the bond and refinance it) – such bonds typically have higher borrowing costs. Therefore, I 
include a dummy for bonds that have the call option.  
Second, I control for a set of issuer characteristics that are lagged one year. States’ 
population; per capita GDP and the unemployment rate to account for production and 
economic conditions; and per capita debt outstanding and per capita own-source general 
revenues to account for the fiscal position of the state governments. Third, I include 
Bondbuyer’s 20 General Obligation Bond Index that provides average estimated yield for 
general obligation bonds in the market on the date of issuance. The bond index controls for 
economic fluctuations in the market conditions over time. Fourth, I include a set of political 
variables as described earlier: state government ideology, a measure of political 
competitiveness, and the party affiliation of the governor. 
In order to examine the mechanism effect that works through credit ratings, I also 
include eight dummies for credit ratings that are constructed as per the description in Table 
4.2. Also, a dummy for split credit ratings controls for bonds whose credit ratings differ across 
rating agencies. I include the region dummies to account for regional effects, since there seem 
to be regional patterns in the adoption of supermajority requirements. Lastly, I include year 
                                                            
8 However, this relationship does not hold across the entire study period since the Great Recession significantly 
affected the role of bond insurance in the municipal securities market (See Cohen (2013); Ely (2012); Nanda & 
Singh, (2004)). All the models include year dummies that partially addresses the changing dynamics of the market. 
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dummies to account for the annual fluctuations and business cycle events like the Great 
Recession that affected the municipal market significantly. Table 4.3 provides the summary 
statistics of the all the variables. 
I use generalized ordered logit in the credit rating models and linear regression in the 
borrowing cost models. The empirical specification for the borrowing cost models assumes the 
form of equation (1) where ݕ௜ is the dependent variable i.e., the true interest cost (TIC) to the 
issuer of the bond.  
ݕ௜ ൌ ߛࡰ࢏࢚ ൅ ࢼ࢞࢏࢚൅ߤ௧ ൅ ߝ	            (1) 
The main variable of interest is a measure of the supermajority requirement ሺࡰሻ. The 
parameter ߛ measures the effect of the supermajority requirement on true interest cost. All 
other covariates are included in the vector ࢞௜௧ and ࢼ is the vector of coefficients associated 
with the covariates. In addition, ߤ௧ captures year effects and ߝ௜௧	is the error term. ࢞௜௧ vector 
includes all the control variables that are discussed earlier. All the standard errors are clustered 
at the state level to allow for correlation between bonds issued by the same state thereby 
relaxing the i.i.d. assumption. 
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Table 4.3: Summary Statistics  
[N=931] 
Variables Mean S.D. Min Max Data Source 
True Interest Cost 3.60 1.08 0.22 6.97 Ipreo 
Long credit rating 6.79 1.39 1.00 8.00 Ipreo/Mergent 
Short credit rating (LOW, MED, HIGH) 2.24 0.69 1.00 3.00 Ipreo/Mergent 
Bond received split rating (1,0) 0.27 0.45 0.00 1.00 Ipreo/Mergent 
PAR value of the issue (million$) 179.12 197.12 0.50 1132.18 Ipreo/Mergent 
Bond exempted from federal income tax 0.86 0.35 0.00 1.00 Mergent 
Bond exempted from state income tax 0.89 0.31 0.00 1.00 Mergent 
Callable Bond 0.74 0.44 0.00 1.00 Mergent 
Bond with insured maturities 0.18 0.39 0.00 1.00 Mergent 
Sold in competitive bid 0.78 0.42 0.00 1.00 Mergent 
Bonds with more than 10-year maturity 0.82 0.38 0.00 1.00 Ipreo/Mergent 
Bondbuyer’s 20-Bond GO Index 4.51 0.43 3.27 5.58 Bondbuyer 
State population (million) 7.74 7.64 0.61 38.43 Census Bureau 
Per Capita GDP ($) 42903 9337 23231 79622 BEA 
Unemployment rate 6.27 1.98 2.30 12.42 BLS 
Per capita total debt ($) 3002.42 1888.80 589.00 12084.00 Census Bureau 
Per capita general OSR ($) 3135.62 968.65 1778.00 20353.00 Census Bureau 
State government ideology 51.24 26.44 0.00 92.45 Berry et al., 2010 
Swing state 0.24 0.43 0.00 1.00 NCSL 
Democratic Governor 0.51 0.50 0.00 1.00 NCSL 
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Finally, I also undertake a set of robustness checks using alternative measures of 
supermajority rules to improve the confidence in the estimates. First, I use the size of the 
supermajority requirement (i.e. whether the state requires a three-fifths, two-thirds, or a three-
fourths supermajority to adopt the tax legislations). My hypothesis is that the states that have 
larger majority thresholds pay a higher premium on their bonds vis-à-vis the states that have a 
relatively lower majority threshold or no requirement. Second, I examine if there is a difference 
in the effect of constitutional supermajority requirement versus the statutory requirement. The 
underlying assumption is that the constitutional supermajority requirements are stronger limits 
than the statutory requirements since it is relatively hard to violate constitutional provisions. 
I run an additional check using an instrumental variable regression. I follow the approach 
of previous studies in the area and employ the provision of citizens initiatives for constitutional 
amendments as an instrument for supermajority rules (Kioko & Martell, 2012; Knight, 2000). 
The underlying logic of the constitutional initiative provision as an instrument for supermajority 
requirements stems from the assumption that the states that allow citizen initiatives to amend 
constitutions are more likely to adopt supermajority requirements. This is a credible 
assumption given that in almost a half of the states with supermajority requirements, voters 
initiated the amendments (Knight, 2000). Furthermore, several of these provisions were 
adopted as part of the original state constitutions or were added in the early 19th century 
during the populist movement. Therefore, the previous studies have argued that it is safe to 
assume that citizen initiatives for constitutional amendments are exogenous to the current fiscal 
outcomes (Kioko & Martell, 2012; Knight, 2000; Poterba, 1996; Poterba & Rueben, 1999b). 
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4.5 ESTIMATION AND RESULTS 
Fiscal institutions may affect subnational borrowing through several mechanisms, but credit 
rating is one of the key factors that influences borrowing costs. Given the ordinal character of 
the credit ratings, I use generalized ordered logit to examine the effect of the supermajority 
requirements on credit ratings.9 Table 4.4 reports the average marginal effects on the 
probability of receiving low, medium, and high credit ratings. In the credit rating regressions, 
holding other variables constant at their actual levels, the states with supermajority 
requirements on average are 33 percentage points less likely to receive AAA credit rating on 
their bonds, 17 percentage points more likely to get a medium rating, and 16 percentage points 
more likely to get a low rating i.e. Aa3/AA- or less. 
These results are robust to alternative definitions and combinations of the credit rating 
thresholds. For example, the findings do not change if I classify AAA and AAA+ in the ‘high 
rating’ category. Furthermore, the linear regression models with a measure of average rating 
across three rating agencies S&P, Moody’s, and Fitch also yield similar results, which show that 
the states with supermajority requirements for tax increases, on average, receive a lower credit 
rating than other states.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
9 Ordered logit specification violates parallel regression assumption based on the likelihood ratio test. Therefore, 
only the results of generalized ordered logit are reported here. 
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Table 4.4: Credit Rating and Supermajority Requirements for Tax Increases 
(Average Marginal Effects, Generalized Ordered Logit Regressions, N=931) 
    
 Prob(Low Rating) Prob (Medium Rating) Prob (High Rating) 
    
Supermajority Rule 0.157*** 0.175*** -0.333*** 
(1=Yes, 0=No) (0.053) (0.058) (0.089) 
Par value (logged) -0.004 -0.005 0.009 
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.017) 
Federal Exemption -0.005 -0.006 0.011 
 (0.022) (0.024) (0.046) 
State Exemption -0.119*** -0.133** 0.252*** 
 (0.039) (0.058) (0.084) 
Call Feature 0.019 0.022 -0.041 
 (0.030) (0.033) (0.062) 
Insured Bond 0.013 0.014 -0.027 
 (0.043) (0.048) (0.091) 
Competitive Sale 0.034 0.038 -0.072 
 (0.029) (0.030) (0.057) 
Long-Term Bond 0.010 0.011 -0.022 
 (0.025) (0.028) (0.052) 
20 Bond GO Index -0.025 -0.027 0.052 
 (0.025) (0.029) (0.053) 
Population (Logged) 0.111*** 0.124*** -0.235*** 
 (0.034) (0.047) (0.066) 
Per Capita GDP -0.000* -0.000* 0.000* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Unemployment Rate -0.009 -0.011 0.020 
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.016) 
Per Capita Debt 0.000* 0.000** -0.000** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Own-Source Revenues 0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
State Government Ideology 0.003** 0.003* -0.006** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) 
Political Volatility 0.061 0.068* -0.129 
 (0.051) (0.041) (0.089) 
Democratic Governor -0.186*** -0.207** 0.393*** 
 (0.051) (0.084) (0.113) 
    
Standard errors clustered at the state level in parentheses  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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In the next set of specifications, I examine the effect of supermajority requirements on 
true interest cost. Table 4.5 reports the results from linear regression with three sets of 
specifications. The first two specifications (columns 1 and 2) show naïve bivariate relationships 
(with and without year and region dummies). The results suggest that the bonds issued by 
supermajority requirements, on average, pay a higher interest cost. Column 3 controls for the 
issue and issuer characteristics, and column 4 controls for a set of political variables and is the 
full model that measures the total effect. In this specification, on average, the states with a 
supermajority voting requirement for a tax increase pay a 21 basis point premium on their true 
interest costs compared to the states that do not have a supermajority requirement. Finally, in 
column 6, I control for credit ratings as an intervening variable, and it reduces the effect by 
around four basis points (the mechanism effect). 
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Table 4.5: Supermajority Requirements and True Interest Costs  
 (1) 
OLS 
(2) 
OLS 
(3) 
OLS 
(4) 
OLS 
(5) 
OLS 
      
      
Supermajority Rule 0.534*** 0.314* 0.251** 0.213** 0.180** 
(1=Yes, 0=No) (0.142) (0.166) (0.094) (0.091) (0.087) 
Baa1/BBB+ or lower     0.903*** 
     (0.203) 
A3/A-     -0.061 
     (0.133) 
A2/A     0.104 
     (0.109) 
A1/A+     0.002 
     (0.107) 
Aa3/AA-     0.146 
     (0.091) 
Aa2/AA     0.153*** 
     (0.055) 
Aa1/AA+     0.047 
     (0.065) 
Par value (logged)   0.018 0.015 0.016 
   (0.018) (0.020) (0.020) 
Federal Exemption   -0.639*** -0.621*** -0.615*** 
   (0.110) (0.108) (0.109) 
State Exemption   -0.206** -0.219** -0.114* 
   (0.093) (0.084) (0.062) 
Call Feature   0.630*** 0.623*** 0.598*** 
   (0.071) (0.067) (0.062) 
Insured Bond   0.041 0.033 0.028 
   (0.039) (0.033) (0.036) 
Competitive Sale   0.072 0.084 0.050 
   (0.051) (0.053) (0.054) 
Long-Term Bond   0.577*** 0.589*** 0.593*** 
   (0.111) (0.110) (0.110) 
20 Bond GO Index   0.788*** 0.790*** 0.783*** 
   (0.067) (0.062) (0.062) 
Population (Logged)   0.125*** 0.116*** 0.110** 
   (0.038) (0.037) (0.043) 
Per Capita GDP   -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Unemployment Rate   0.038 0.043 0.030 
   (0.028) (0.027) (0.024) 
Per Capita Debt   0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
     (continued) 
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(Table 4.5 continued)      
      
Own-Source Revenues   0.000 -0.000 0.000 
   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
State Government Ideology    0.004** 0.003* 
    (0.002) (0.001) 
Political Volatility    0.077 0.046 
    (0.056) (0.045) 
Democratic Governor    -0.180** -0.109* 
    (0.079) (0.058) 
      
Year Dummies No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
Region Dummies No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
Observations 931 931 931 931 931 
      
Standard errors clustered at the state level in parentheses  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
The effect of the supermajority rule is robust to several alternative specifications, 
subsamples, and supermajority measures. Table 4.6 summarizes three key tests involving 
alternative operationalization of supermajority requirement and the impact on borrowing costs. 
Column 1 reports the estimates of regressions that use a set of dummies for the size of 
supermajority requirements. All three coefficients are positive and significant at the 10 percent 
level, suggesting that states with supermajority requirements pay higher interest on their bond 
than the states without these requirements. Furthermore, states with a three-fifths 
supermajority requirement pay about four basis points lower premium than the states with a 
two-thirds requirement, but roughly the same premium as the states with three-fourth 
requirement.10 
                                                            
10Arkansas and Montana are two states driving the coefficient on three-fourths category. Oklahoma is the only 
other state with three-fourth supermajority requirement, but it is not a part of the sample. It is plausible that there 
are certain unobserved factors that I am not accounting for in my estimation leading to lower impact of three-
fourth requirement. For example, the supermajority requirement in Arkansas was adopted after the Great 
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Column 2 reports the estimates of the regression in which I use a set of dummies 
indicating whether the state has a constitutional or statutory requirement as the dependent 
variable. Both the coefficients are positive and significant, suggesting that bonds issued in the 
states with either of these requirements have higher true interest costs relative to the base 
category – states without a supermajority requirement. However, contrary to my expectation, 
the states with constitutional requirements pay a marginally lower interest cost premium. 
Lastly, column 3 reports the results of the two-stage least squares regression – using the 
provision for citizen initiatives for constitutional amendments as the instrumental variable for 
supermajority requirements. This specification also suggests that states with supermajority 
requirements pay a premium on their bonds in the form of higher borrowing costs, and the 
two-stage least squares estimate is highly comparable to the estimate of total effect in Table 
4.5. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
Depression and it is plausible that market does not account for this long-lasting constraint in the same way as it 
does in other states. 
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Table 4.6: Robustness Tests: Supermajority Requirements and True Interest Cost 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 OLS OLS 2SLS 
    
Three-Fifth Supermajority Requirement 0.197* - - 
 (0.109)   
Two-Third Supermajority Requirement 0.235* - - 
 (0.130)   
Three-Fourth Supermajority Requirement 0.191** - - 
 (0.094)   
Constitutional Supermajority Requirement - 0.205** - 
  (0.094)  
Statutory Supermajority Requirement - 0.221** - 
  (0.104)  
Supermajority Requirement (Instrumented) - - 0.229* 
(Provision of Citizen Initiatives to amend Constitution)   (0.133) 
Par value (logged) 0.014 0.015 0.015 
 (0.020) (0.021) (0.019) 
Federal Exemption -0.624*** -0.621*** -0.620*** 
 (0.108) (0.109) (0.102) 
State Exemption -0.218** -0.219** -0.219*** 
 (0.087) (0.084) (0.081) 
Call Feature 0.625*** 0.624*** 0.623*** 
 (0.067) (0.066) (0.064) 
Insured Bond 0.030 0.035 0.032 
 (0.038) (0.035) (0.033) 
Competitive Sale 0.082 0.084 0.084 
 (0.051) (0.053) (0.052) 
Long-Term Bond 0.590*** 0.588*** 0.588*** 
 (0.111) (0.109) (0.110) 
20 Bond GO Index 0.788*** 0.789*** 0.790*** 
 (0.063) (0.062) (0.060) 
Population (Logged) 0.114*** 0.116*** 0.118*** 
 (0.036) (0.036) (0.034) 
Per Capita GDP -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Unemployment Rate 0.043 0.043 0.042* 
 (0.028) (0.026) (0.024) 
Per Capita Debt 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Own-Source Revenues -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
    
    
   (continued) 
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(Table 4.6 continued)    
    
State Government Ideology 0.004** 0.004** 0.004** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Political Volatility 0.076 0.075 0.077 
 (0.056) (0.057) (0.056) 
Democratic Governor -0.179** -0.183** -0.178** 
 (0.080) (0.078) (0.075) 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
    
Region Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
    
Observations 931 931 931 
    
Standard errors clustered at the state level in parentheses  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 87 
 
4.6 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
This essay focuses on understanding the effects of supermajority requirements for tax 
increases on the borrowing costs in the municipal bond market. I find that states with 
supermajority requirements, on average, receive a lower credit rating on their bonds. As a 
result, states pay a premium of 18 to 21 basis points on their general obligation debt, which 
may quantify as a significant cost in debt service in the long term. For example, Appendix Table 
C1 shows a hypothetical calculation for two identical bond issues with par value of $200 million 
and 15 year maturity. Given the maturity structure and coupon rates, the 18 basis points 
difference in true interest costs translates to around $5 million in debt service or budgetary 
expenditure over the life of the bond – a significant cost from a budgetary perspective. 
This article has focused only on GO bonds, which are typically securities with the 
lowest default risk. Future studies may consider the effect of such requirements on other types 
of securities such as bonds issued by conduit agencies or local issuers. Furthermore, the 
supermajority requirements may also influence the performance of bonds in the secondary 
market – buying and selling of bonds after the initial issuance. 
The policy debate and political discussions on supermajority requirements have mostly 
focused on the impact of supermajority requirements on the tax burden and tax rates of states 
incorporating these requirements while ignoring the unintended consequences of such fiscal 
rules. As noted earlier, at least ten states are discussing or have discussed the adoption of 
supermajority requirements in the recent years. It is important that the policymakers in these 
states account for these unintended consequences and external costs while deciding on the 
future of these requirements.  
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APPENDIX A 
 
Table A1: Balanced Budget Rules and Sector Wise Spending in Developing Economies, FE 
(Dependent Variable: Logged Sector Wise Spending, Exponentiated Coefficients) 
 Fixed Effects Estimates of Sector-Wise Spending 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Total  
Education 
 
Health 
 
Social 
Protection 
Primary 
Sector 
Trans- 
Com 
Defense 
 
Other 
 
         
Balanced Budget Rule 0.960 0.894 0.607** 0.620 0.671* 0.824 0.931 1.495*** 
 (0.081) (0.100) (0.128) (0.177) (0.135) (0.309) (0.089) (0.164) 
Population (Logged) 4.120*** 9.587* 1.946 1.032 2.111 0.160 4.438** 7.806* 
 (1.215) (11.822) (2.507) (2.345) (3.150) (0.642) (2.996) (9.319) 
% Children 0.984* 1.027 0.989 1.032 1.026 0.982 1.020 0.986 
 (0.008) (0.029) (0.055) (0.022) (0.057) (0.043) (0.028) (0.039) 
% Seniors 1.123** 1.126 0.789 0.841 0.977 0.768 0.879 1.318** 
 (0.058) (0.119) (0.191) (0.201) (0.159) (0.468) (0.074) (0.174) 
GDP (Logged) 3.106*** 7.344*** 0.924 2.288 12.149*** 4.628 2.363** 1.645 
 (0.281) (3.620) (0.873) (2.200) (4.707) (4.444) (0.757) (0.503) 
Unemployment Rate 1.016** 1.001 0.992 0.994 1.044** 0.976 0.998 1.008 
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.020) (0.018) (0.021) (0.033) (0.007) (0.017) 
Economic Growth 0.997 0.991* 1.002 0.989 1.011 1.022 1.007*** 0.991* 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.006) (0.010) (0.008) (0.014) (0.002) (0.005) 
Decentralization 1.000 1.001 1.001 1.002 1.006** 1.002 0.996 1.000 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.001) 
Left Ideology 0.951 1.051 1.533 1.221 1.020 1.264 1.092 0.818** 
 (0.034) (0.137) (0.513) (0.356) (0.126) (0.347) (0.100) (0.080) 
Election Year 1.006 1.002 1.043 0.980 1.041 1.038 1.029 1.003 
 (0.014) (0.022) (0.048) (0.043) (0.044) (0.053) (0.023) (0.025) 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 319 282 282 280 297 278 267 297 
Number of 
Countries 35 34 34 34 34 32 
33 34 
 
      
 
 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Robust standard errors in parentheses  
Notes: (1) Primary sector includes Agriculture, Fuel, and Mining (2) Trans-Com: Transport and 
Communications 
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Table A2: Balanced Budget Rules and Sector Wise Spending in Developing Economies, GMM 
(Dependent Variable: Logged Sector-wise Spending, Exponentiated Coefficients) 
 GMM Estimates of Sector-wise Spending 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Total  
Education 
 
Health 
 
Social 
Protection 
Primary 
Sector 
Trans- 
Com 
Defense 
 
Other 
 
         
Balanced Budget Rule 0.947 0.975 0.791** 0.764** 0.883 0.973 0.966 1.056 
 (0.052) (0.063) (0.083) (0.091) (0.122) (0.088) (0.039) (0.116) 
Population (Logged) 1.491*** 1.110** 1.301*** 1.194*** 1.244*** 1.216*** 1.127*** 1.333*** 
 (0.093) (0.058) (0.114) (0.077) (0.073) (0.054) (0.039) (0.080) 
% Children 0.986*** 0.986 0.982** 0.981 0.986 0.995 1.004 0.995 
 (0.004) (0.010) (0.009) (0.012) (0.018) (0.012) (0.006) (0.008) 
% Seniors 0.981*** 0.968* 0.969* 0.966* 0.972 0.994 1.004 1.000 
 (0.007) (0.017) (0.017) (0.019) (0.031) (0.022) (0.009) (0.015) 
GDP (Logged) 1.403*** 1.050 1.114 1.280* 1.140 1.066 1.044 1.312*** 
 (0.107) (0.081) (0.113) (0.168) (0.147) (0.091) (0.040) (0.117) 
Unemployment Rate 1.002 0.990 0.998 0.980 0.993 1.007 1.001 1.012 
 (0.003) (0.006) (0.011) (0.016) (0.014) (0.013) (0.005) (0.007) 
Economic Growth 1.002 1.005 1.001 1.005 1.021** 1.004 1.006** 0.992** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.010) (0.006) (0.003) (0.004) 
Decentralization 1.000 1.000 0.999 0.999 0.997 1.000 0.999 1.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
Left Ideology 1.017 0.964 1.134* 1.032 1.030 1.069 0.994 1.007 
 (0.027) (0.046) (0.078) (0.077) (0.106) (0.130) (0.039) (0.048) 
Election Year 1.009 1.025 1.018 1.053 1.070 1.053 1.014 0.998 
 (0.010) (0.022) (0.026) (0.071) (0.046) (0.058) (0.021) (0.019) 
Lagged Spending 1.782*** 2.415*** 2.060*** 2.260*** 2.091*** 2.169*** 2.493*** 1.962*** 
 (0.110) (0.119) (0.160) (0.129) (0.120) (0.138) (0.062) (0.123) 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 314 273 273 270 290 270 258 290 
Number of Countries 35 34 34 34 34 32 31 34 
AR1 (p-value) 0.007 0.013 0.019 0.010 0.001 0.010 0.002 0.005 
AR2 (p-value)  0.010 0.606 0.293 0.277 0.900 0.813 0.155 0.355 
Hansen (p-value) 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Robust standard errors in parentheses  
Notes: (1) Primary sector includes Agriculture, Fuel, and Mining (2) Trans-Com: Transport and 
Communications 
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Table A3: Balanced Budget Rules and Sector Wise Spending in High-Income Countries, FE 
(Dependent Variable: Logged Sector-wise Spending, Exponentiated Coefficients) 
 Fixed Effects Estimates of Sector-Wise Spending 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Total  
Education 
 
Health 
 
Social 
Protection 
Primary 
Sector 
Trans- 
Com 
Defense 
 
Other 
 
         
Balanced Budget 
Rule 
0.922* 1.130 0.542*** 0.845* 0.914 0.802 1.063 0.930 
 (0.044) (0.093) (0.104) (0.078) (0.085) (0.139) (0.115) (0.065) 
Population (Logged) 2.879 2.215 6.498 0.169 1.299 0.004* 6.437 11.377** 
 (2.308) (4.448) (23.153) (0.294) (2.375) (0.012) (8.554) (10.285) 
% Children 1.073** 1.151* 1.245 1.190* 1.194** 0.823 1.041 1.067 
 (0.028) (0.090) (0.215) (0.102) (0.086) (0.102) (0.065) (0.058) 
% Seniors 1.110** 1.000 1.922*** 1.614*** 1.105 0.828 0.948 1.031 
 (0.048) (0.100) (0.422) (0.190) (0.197) (0.119) (0.096) (0.115) 
GDP (Logged) 3.804*** 6.387* 1.747 12.814*** 12.270** 10.039 36.577*** 2.218 
 (0.926) (6.736) (2.686) (8.443) (11.250) (16.606) (21.444) (1.166) 
Unemployment Rate 1.017** 1.037* 1.045 1.026 0.999 0.940 0.994 1.004 
 (0.007) (0.018) (0.048) (0.020) (0.025) (0.038) (0.014) (0.011) 
Economic Growth 1.001 0.990 1.022 1.000 0.985 0.971 0.996 1.005 
 (0.004) (0.008) (0.019) (0.009) (0.011) (0.018) (0.009) (0.007) 
Decentralization 0.999 0.997 0.987 0.995 0.991** 0.991 1.003 1.004* 
 (0.001) (0.007) (0.012) (0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.002) 
Left Ideology 1.014 0.961 1.072 1.076 1.022 0.942 0.931 1.011 
 (0.023) (0.072) (0.158) (0.086) (0.075) (0.111) (0.072) (0.051) 
Election Year 1.007 0.989 1.064 1.030* 1.026 0.964 1.018 1.004 
 (0.007) (0.018) (0.056) (0.018) (0.025) (0.029) (0.026) (0.018) 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 243 243 238 238 233 229 240 243 
Number of 
Countries 
28 28 28 27 27 27 27 28 
         
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Robust standard errors in parentheses  
Notes: (1) Primary sector includes Agriculture, Fuel, and Mining (2) Trans-Com: Transport and 
Communications 
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Table A4: Balanced Budget Rules and Sector Wise Spending in High-Income Countries, GMM 
(Dependent Variable: Logged Sector-wise Spending, Exponentiated Coefficients) 
 GMM Estimates of Sector-wise Spending 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Total  
Education 
 
Health 
 
Social 
Protection 
Primary 
Sector 
Trans- 
Com 
Defense 
 
Other 
 
         
Balanced Budget Rule 0.983* 1.029 0.934 0.938* 0.991 1.034 0.993 1.019 
 (0.009) (0.021) (0.090) (0.031) (0.037) (0.081) (0.031) (0.026) 
Population (Logged) 1.042** 1.029 1.416*** 1.329*** 1.085*** 1.218*** 1.172** 1.044 
 (0.017) (0.025) (0.145) (0.106) (0.031) (0.077) (0.087) (0.040) 
% Children 1.000 1.008 1.066** 1.006 1.000 1.010 1.010 0.981* 
 (0.005) (0.007) (0.027) (0.013) (0.009) (0.016) (0.014) (0.011) 
% Seniors 1.002 1.011 1.121*** 1.037 1.005 1.048* 1.004 0.977** 
 (0.006) (0.009) (0.041) (0.024) (0.010) (0.030) (0.015) (0.011) 
GDP (Logged) 1.075** 1.109 2.106*** 1.811*** 1.017 0.869 1.109 1.058 
 (0.039) (0.092) (0.519) (0.287) (0.083) (0.076) (0.138) (0.059) 
Unemployment Rate 1.002 0.998 1.047*** 1.016** 0.993 0.970*** 0.988** 0.999 
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.017) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.006) (0.005) 
Economic Growth 1.005*** 1.011** 1.011 1.000 0.996 0.994 1.008 1.003 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.011) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.003) 
Decentralization 0.999** 0.997 0.980*** 0.991*** 0.999 0.995 1.000 1.000 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.007) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) 
Left Ideology 1.016 0.987 1.304*** 1.124* 0.953 0.991 1.003 1.017 
 (0.011) (0.022) (0.134) (0.070) (0.034) (0.056) (0.015) (0.016) 
Election Year 1.002 1.001 0.994 0.989 0.970 0.949 1.019 1.031* 
 (0.011) (0.020) (0.053) (0.024) (0.028) (0.031) (0.023) (0.019) 
Lagged Spending 2.598*** 2.648*** 2.129*** 2.122*** 2.490*** 2.339*** 2.320*** 2.547*** 
 (0.040) (0.066) (0.119) (0.122) (0.062) (0.105) (0.165) (0.095) 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 241 240 233 235 230 226 238 240 
Number of Countries 28 28 28 27 27 27 27 28 
AR1 (p-value) 0.001 0.013 0.003 0.015 0.001 0.011 0.008 0.002 
AR2 (p-value)  0.403 0.215 0.167 0.403 0.045 0.380 0.661 0.210 
Hansen (p-value) 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Robust standard errors in parentheses  
Notes: (1) Primary sector includes Agriculture, Fuel, and Mining (2) Trans-Com: Transport and 
Communications 
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Table A5: Balanced Budget Rules and Social Sector Spending by Country Groups, 1990-2012 
Robustness Test without Fiscal Decentralization Control 
(Dependent Variable: Logged Social Spending, Exponentiated Coefficients)  
 
 High-Income 
Countries 
Middle and Low-Income 
Countries 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  
Fixed Effects  
 
System GMM  
 
Fixed Effects 
 
System GMM 
     
Balanced Budget Rule 1.107 1.029 0.838** 0.869** 
 (0.103) (0.047) (0.071) (0.050) 
Population (Logged) 2.429** 1.053** 1.736 1.165*** 
 (0.822) (0.024) (1.325) (0.057) 
% Children 0.968* 0.995 1.024 0.997 
 (0.018) (0.005) (0.017) (0.010) 
% Seniors 1.094** 1.004 1.093 0.993 
 (0.038) (0.006) (0.097) (0.019) 
GDP (Logged) 5.773*** 1.036 3.155*** 1.247*** 
 (2.119) (0.049) (0.943) (0.097) 
Unemployment Rate 1.022** 1.007 1.014 0.994 
 (0.010) (0.005) (0.014) (0.009) 
Economic Growth 0.996 1.008** 0.994 1.001 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Left Ideology 1.008 1.028 1.046 1.011 
 (0.044) (0.019) (0.080) (0.036) 
Fiscal Decentralization - - - - 
     
Election Year 0.997 1.009 1.011 1.013 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.016) (0.014) 
Lag Social Spending  2.535***  2.319*** 
  (0.053)  (0.076) 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 733 730 986 971 
Number of Countries 37 37 58 58 
AR1(p-value)  0.006  0.000 
AR2 (p-value)   0.144  0.306 
Hansen (p-value)  1.000  1.000 
     
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Robust standard errors in parentheses 
 
 
 
 
 
   
93 
 
APPENDIX B 
 
 
 
 
 
r= -0.652       r=0.197 
Figure B1- Correlations between Surface Road Density and Poverty Rate in the NSC states 
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APPENDIX C 
 
Table C1: Example of two bids with 18 basis points difference in True Interest Cost* 
(Identical $200 million bond issues of fifteen year maturity) 
  State A State B 
Year Principal Coupon Interest Debt Service Coupon Interest Debt Service 
(        
2016   $11,825,000 $11,825,000  $12,091,000 $12,091,000 
2017   $11,825,000 $11,825,000  $12,091,000 $12,091,000 
2018   $11,825,000 $11,825,000  $12,091,000 $12,091,000 
2019   $11,825,000 $11,825,000  $12,091,000 $12,091,000 
2020 $5,000,000 0.055 $11,825,000 $16,825,000 0.0419 $12,091,000 $17,091,000 
2021 $5,000,000 0.055 $11,550,000 $16,550,000 0.0419 $11,881,500 $16,881,500 
2022 $5,000,000 0.055 $11,275,000 $16,275,000 0.0419 $11,672,000 $16,672,000 
2023 $10,000,000 0.055 $11,000,000 $21,000,000 0.0575 $11,462,500 $21,462,500 
2024 $10,000,000 0.055 $10,450,000 $20,450,000 0.0575 $10,887,500 $20,887,500 
2025 $10,000,000 0.055 $9,900,000 $19,900,000 0.0575 $10,312,500 $20,312,500 
2026 $15,000,000 0.055 $9,350,000 $24,350,000 0.0575 $9,737,500 $24,737,500 
2027 $15,000,000 0.055 $8,525,000 $23,525,000 0.0575 $8,875,000 $23,875,000 
2028 $15,000,000 0.055 $7,700,000 $22,700,000 0.0575 $8,012,500 $23,012,500 
2029 $55,000,000 0.0625 $6,875,000 $61,875,000 0.0650 $7,150,000 $62,150,000 
2030 $55,000,000 0.0625 $3,437,500 $58,437,500 0.0650 $3,575,000 $58,575,000 
        
Total $200,000,000  $149,187,500 $349,187,500  $154,021,000 $354,021,000 
 
TIC for State A= 5.9614% 
TIC for State B = 6.1432%   
TICB – TICA = 18.17 basis points 
InterestB – InterestA = $ 4,833,500  
*Adapted from the question bank of Mikesell, J.L., Fiscal Administration: Analysis and Application for the 
Public Sector, pp. 676. Ninth edition, Cengage Learning, Boston MA 
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